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SOCRATES' NEW CLOTHES: SUBSTITUTING
PERSUASION FOR LEARNING IN CLINICAL
PRACTICE INSTRUCTION
ROBERT J. CONDLIN*
You can fool all of the people
some of the time,
And some of the people
all of the time.
But you shouldn't try to fool
all of the people all of the time.
Rick Abel - 1981
Clinical practice instruction is strategic intervention' by law
teachers in student performance of lawyering tasks.2 In intervening, the
teacher evaluates the quality of the student's performance, criticizes its
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland. Many people commented on
earlier drafts of this article and I am grateful to them. Kenneth Abraham, Thomas Bergin,
Martin Levin, and Stephen Saltzburg made special contributions for which I am
particularly thankful.
1. Intervene may be an unfamiliar concept in this context. I shall use it to mean
to enter into an ongoing system of relationships, to come between or among persons,
groups, or objects for the purpose of helping them....
[In intervening, one] acknowledges interdependencies between [teacher] and
[student] but focuses on how to maintain, or increase, the [student'sl autonomy; how
to differentiate even more clearly the boundaries between the [student] and the
[teacher]; and how to conceptualize and define the [student's competence] indepen-
dently of the [teacher's]. A [teacher], in this view, assists a [student] to become more
effective in problem solving, decision making and decision implementation in such a
way that the [student] can continue to be increasingly effective in these activities and
have a decreasing need for the [teacher] ....
[The necessary conditions to effective intervention arel the generation of valid
information . . .[the providing of opportunity for] free, informed choice . . .[and the
presence in the student of] internal commitment to the choices made.
C. ARGYRIS, INTERVENTION THEORY AND METHOD: A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE VIEW 15-16
(1970) (emphasis in original). See generally H. HORNSTEIN, B. BUNKER, W. BURKE, M.
GINDES & R. LEWICKI, SOCIAL INTERVENTION (1971). See also C. WEGENER, LIBERAL
EDUCATION AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 160 (1978).
2. For most, the distinctive feature of clinical practice instruction is this last
element - its setting in the world of actual law practice - where "[flacts may be
unavailable, obscure, disputed, or distorted. The law may be unclear, or in flux. The goals
of other persons - clients, adversaries, and decision-makers, to name a few - may be
cloudy or may conflict with those of the lawyer. The lawyer may be caught in a bind
between two or more conflicting ethical values, or between an ethical value and a very
important practical goal. Choice of the best strategy may require him to estimate and
weigh probabilities. The lawyer rarely feels that he has enough time in which to do the
most thorough job that he could." Meltsner & Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76
(223)
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implicit theories of effective lawyering, and analyzes the connection
between the two. 3 Practice instruction is said to be more humane,
COLUM. L. REV. 581, 584 (1976) (based in part on P. Schrag, My Clinical Teaching - A
Review 2-3 (August 1976) (unpublished memorandum to the Faculty of Law, Columbia
University)).
For years clinical instruction was nearly synonymous with student practice, and
the worth of such instruction was thought to be measured in major part by the range of
lawyering experiences that it provided. See W. PINCUS, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR LAW
STUDENTS xii, 28, 70-71 (1980). The principal funding agency for clinical programs
conditions inclusion in its annual survey of clinical education on the adoption of this
definition of "clinical." See COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT 1977-78, at 22-23; SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION 1978-1979, at xxiii. Some still argue for fieldwork as the litmus test for clinical
instruction. See, e.g., Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and
Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 71 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Barnhizer, Clinical
Method]; Barnhizer, Clinical Education at the Crossroads: The Need for Direction, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REv. 1025, 1041-49 [hereinafter cited as Barnhizer, Clinical Education]. Robert
Stevens has described this view - I believe correctly - as the "compulsory chapel"
approach. See Stevens, Preface, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 692-94. The equation of practice
experience with practice instruction is fundamentally wrong. It is not experience itself
that is valuable as much as it is the interpretation of experience, both one's own and
others' (including that represented on video tapes of lawyers' performances and used as
teaching aids in classrooms), from a conscious conceptual framework of what ought to be
done.
Proponents of the "experiencing" view frequently add that student lawyering
experiences should be "supervised," see W. PINCUS, supra, at xii, 314, 394 (1980), and few
would quarrel with this, but supervision can mean dogmatic and simplistic lecture in rules
of thumb for handling cases that are seen as typical, as easily as it can mean candid and
detailed analysis of carefully collected empirical data (as opposed to impressions, see note
35 infra) about work product. For supervision to be helpful it must proceed from a clear
and explicit conception of how particular lawyering and learning tasks ought to occur. It is
the absence of such a theory of lawyering or of instruction (except to say that one "learns
by doing" - doing what is rarely addressed) in the clinical literature that leads to the
inference that its authors are concerned primarily about providing experiences rather
than interpretation. See, e.g., G. GROSSMAN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY 40-55 (1974); Berryhill, Clinical Education - A Golden Dancer?, 13 U.
RICH. L. REV. 69, 89-97 (1978); Bratt, Beyond the Law School Classroom and Clinic - A
Multidisciplinary Approach to Legal Education, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 199, 207-12 (1977).
3. This definition omits several familiar issues. Chief among them are the
administrative questions surrounding the time, place, and manner of supervision. These
topics have been discussed carefully and at length by others. See, e.g., Barnhizer, Clinical
Method, supra note 2; Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency, 40 MD. L.
REV. 284 (1981); M. Hermann, On Looking at Lawyering: An Examination of Observation
and Critique (May 1977) (unpublished paper) (copy on file with R. Condlin).
This definition may obscure another important issue: whether clinical instruction
should be thought of primarily as a methodology, a new subject matter, or both. Gary
Bellow describes clinical instruction as a new methodology for law study. See Bellow, On
Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodolo-
gy, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374, 379 (CLEPR 1973). See also M.
KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 19-20 (1980) (approving of Bellow's
approach); Barnhizer, Clinical Education, supra note 2, at 1027-28, 1050 (discussing
clinical instruction as if the question of methodology versus subject matter did not exist);
Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 2, at 584-85 (same). Professor Bellow, however, probably
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personal, sensitive, and democratic than its classroom equivalent
because the sometimes dominating and manipulative technique of the
classroom 4 is more difficult to use when the teaching relationship is
does not mean it literally when he says that recognized role-taking, learning grounded in
student experience, and the use of role adjustment tensions to motivate are new with or
distinctive to clinical study. Those characteristics also describe most of the pedagogy of the
first year of law school during which students assume the law firm associate role of an
intellectual apprentice who solves analytical puzzles within a mentor's definition of a
problem. The difference between first-year study and clinical instruction is that the roles
are different, but that is not a methodological distinction. See Condlin, The Myth of the
Clinical Methodology, 2 CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. PERSPECTIVE 9 (1978).
An equally distinctive attribute of clinical study is that it concerns a new and
separate subject matter in law school instruction. That subject matter is best described as
the psychology, politics, and philosophy of the interpersonal processes that make up law
practice: for example, learning, bargaining, decision-making, and argument, or facsimiles
thereof. See id. at 10. In varying combinations these processes constitute almost all lawyer
interpersonal behavior. Some describe this subject matter in terms of its role-specific tasks
of interviewing, negotiation, argument, and the like, see W. PINCUS, supra note 2, at
78-79, 370-71, but, focusing on underlying processes makes it easier to incorporate the
insights and frameworks of other disciplines and to identify the threads that link
lawyering tasks together. The result should be more sophisticated cognitive maps of each
lawyering interaction.
William Simon has pointed out, correctly, that clinical teachers have neglected
the political dimension of this subject matter. See Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a
New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487, 487-490 (1980).
The question of subject matter versus methodology is more than a matter of
whether the glass is half empty or half full. Within the law school culture, a
characterization of clinical instruction as a "subject matter" would press teachers more
firmly towards explication of idea content, research agenda, and basic theory than does
the characterization "methodology." If clinical teachers were pressed harder to identify,
explain, and test what they purport to teach, several benefits might follow. The ideas that
this writing would produce could become a core cognitive content that would allow clinical
instructors to make more use of classroom and pre-planned simulation pedagogy than they
do now. Fieldwork programs could become the final rather than the first or only setting in
which clinical instruction occurred. Clinical instruction could occur in "courses" (as much
as in "programs") that could proliferate, be subdivided by subject matter, and be arranged
in sequences, each building on the learning of its predecessors. The per-unit cost of such
instruction would decrease, as fieldwork programs were used less to carry the burden of
such instruction. I offer this conception not as an ideal, but simply as an improvement
upon the present reality. Experiments like Professor Bellow's Legal Services Institute
hold the most promise for developing new types of organizations for educating lawyers. See
G. Bellow, J. Kettleson, M. Lipsky, P. Newman, W. Simon, & K. Stone, The Legal Services
Institute: A Proposal (Mar. 16, 1978) (grant proposal submitted to the Legal Services
Corporation) (copy on file with R. Condlin).
4. I do not discuss the criticisms of law classroom methodology as dominating and
manipulative. Those criticisms are well known and speak for themselves. See, e.g.,
Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACT. 71, 72-74
(1970); Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 457-62,
480-87 (1970); Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 406-18
(1971); Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 93, 109-14 (1968). This domination can be perceived as well
as real. See note 16 infra. Nor do I discuss the inappropriateness of domination and
manipulation (as opposed to influence) to an instructional relationship. My point is that
clinical teachers believed these criticisms to be true and relevant and sought to avoid
1981]
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one-to-one.5 This difference, it is asserted, has a positive effect on the
kinds of lawyers law students become.6
This claim is intuitively appealing but it may be factually incorrect.
This article suggests that only the more stylized forms of manipulative
classroom technique may be absent from clinical practice instruction -
that the substance of practice instruction may track the patterns that
clinical teachers profess to avoid. If this is correct, the effect, far from
positive, is that practice instruction encourages students to be superfi-
cial, authoritarian, close-minded, and amoral.7
This investigation is preliminary and its conclusions are
speculative.8 But the substance of the hypothesis is sufficiently
troublesome and the evidence for it sufficiently widespread that the
speculation requires serious investigation. The article is not critical of
dominating and manipulative practices in their own teaching. See, e.g., Barnhizer,
Clinical Method, supra note 2, at 67, 75, 104-07; Bratt, supra note 2, at 199, 203; Meltsner
& Schrag, Scenes From a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1978). Domination and
manipulation are not the only objections that clinical teachers had to traditional law
instruction. See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 3, at 394-97.
5. Bellow, supra note 3, at 384-85; Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the University
of Southern California Clinical Semester, 44 So. CALIF. L. REV. 664, 693 (1971); Meltsner
& Schrag, supra note 4, at 6; Barnhizer, Clinical Method, supra note 2, at 105, 134-35.
Not all clinical teachers claim to avoid dominating and manipulative teaching behaviors;
some simply agree that they should. For the relevance of my analysis, this latter view is
enough.
6. Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 2, at 625-26; Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at
10-11, 20-23; Barnhizer, Clinical Method, supra note 2, at 75, 104-05. See also
GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 67 (1980) (Report of the AALS-ABA
Committee on Guidelines for Clinical Legal Education). But see note 112 infra;
Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic
Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 541 (1978).
7. I mention these effects because I believe that they are implicit throughout my
analysis. I do not deliver fully, however, on the promise, implied in the text, to discuss
these effects directly. I discuss the effects generally, see text accompanying notes 101 to
106 infra and note 112 infra, and outline some of the forms that they take, see note 112
infra, but a full-blown discussion of the pedagogy, politics, and morality of practice
instruction will be the subject of a future article. This article is primarily descriptive - I
do not use that term pejoratively - of a set of communication difficulties in practice
instruction that seem to have been missed or ignored by those in the field.
8. See note 66 infra. This will be the first of a series of articles analyzing the
communication patterns of law trained people. In one sense, this article is a table of
contents of what is to follow. See note 7 supra and notes 20, 22, 45, 53, 59, 64, 102, and 111
infra. I plan to examine several typical and representative law communication situations,
to identify unselfconscious habit and underlying ideology, and to evaluate the appropriate-
ness of each. In the process, I hope to refine both the conceptual apparatus and the data
collection procedures used in this article and to make many of this article's footnotes into




clinical 9 practice instruction per se. Such instruction is a potentially
significant addition to legal education. 10 Before this potential can be
9. I do not use the term "clinical" eagerly. Like "Socratic," it has as many meanings
as there are people who use it. In addition, for many law teachers, the term is pejorative,
conjuring up images of mechanistic instruction in the administrative routine of law
practice. These concerns notwithstanding, I use the term because other labels might be
more confusing.
10. In addition to its subject matter contributions, see note 3 supra, clinical
instruction has the potential to add to the study of substantive law doctrine and policy, see
Jenkins, Theory and Practice in Law, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 404, 405-13, 423-24 (1966)
(discussing the philosophical basis for this assertion), and to the development of positive
legal theory. For example, a substantive course in criminal law, taught from the Model
Penal Code, dissects in detail the logic, wisdom, clarity, and elegance of the Code's
doctrinal categories. But the experience of representing a defendant under such a
statutory scheme might suggest other questions: for example, does the proliferation of
offenses under such a rationalist code increase the likelihood that defendants will plead
guilty? For a discussion of why this might be unacceptable as a matter of policy, see
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978). To answer this
question, one would need more information than is available in law school classrooms
about how defendants make decisions regarding pleas. See Sudnow, Normal Crimes:
Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROB. 255
(1965). This data is virtually unavoidable in the clinical practice process and often is the
source of the greatest anxiety in such work. Many such issues arise when one looks at the
manner in which humans implement rule frameworks.
Clinical instruction also can contribute to positive legal theory. For example, a
direct relationship has been identified between party control of aspects of the adjudication
process and subsequent party perceptions of the justice of the results of that process. See
Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 541 (1978). For a
comprehensive discussion of the rationale for party control, see Spiegel, Lawyering and
Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41,
73-112 (1979). See also Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078,
1080-81 (1979) (more limited discussion); Luban, The Lawyer as Papa: Paternalism in the
Legal Profession and the Problem of Imputed Ends (unpublished paper) (copy on file with
R. Condlin) (discussion of philosophical justification for client control). This control must
be real, not illusory, and must be held by the parties directly. Thibaut & Walker, supra, at
545-47. If lawyers can silently subvert a rule system providing for party control, as
clinical experience might suggest, see note 112 infra, that fact would have important
implications for the foregoing theory.
Clinical instruction also may contribute a distinct reformist perspective to the
study of law by focusing on the individual lawyer as a vehicle for social reform. (For a
pessimistic view of what lawyers can do, individually or collectively, see Abel, Socializing
the Legal Profession, 1 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 5, 39-42 (1979).)
But see Maclntyre, Regulation: A Substitute for Morality, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Feb. 1980, at 33. The individual as a vehicle of reform is a theme of much great literature
and perhaps some social theory, including some that is currently fashionable. See, e.g., B.
LEVY, BARBARISM WITH A HUMAN FACE (1979) (the individual rather than social systems,
institutions, or rule structures ought to be the focus of political reform); Sheehan, Paris:
Moses and Polytheism, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Jan. 24, 1980, at 13, 13-15 (describing how Levy
is currently fashionable). Moreover, in order to succeed, it is arguable, reform of rules,
systems, and institutions must be accompanied by reform of individuals' theories of action.
See C. ARGYRIS, supra note 1, at 1-8. See also W. KAUFMANN, WITHOUT GUILT AND JUSTICE
(1973). If clinical teachers made this perspective the intellectual basis of their work, the
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realized, however, clinical teachers must deal more adequately with this
possible contradiction between their own theory and practice.I
I. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS - THE PERSUASION AND LEARNING MODES
To understand the possible weaknesses of clinical practice
instruction, 2 one must first understand the intrinsic ambiguity of
teacher-student dialogue. For a number of reasons, most instructional
statements by clinical teachers and students are inevitably ambiguous.
First, everyone understands the world in a slightly idiosyncratic way;
each person's understanding is influenced by values, intelligence,
experience, ideology, imagination, and emotional sensibilities that are
mixed uniquely. These unique mixes, in turn, produce patterns of
understanding that are as distinctive as fingerprints. These patterns
dictate not only the way that an individual explains reality to himself
but also the way that he listens to and interprets other people's
major unstudied variable in the justice of the legal system - the patterned behavior of
individual lawyers - would receive its due weight. See L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING
BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS XiX (1978).
11. Clinical instruction has a more serious, and I suspect related, hurdle to overcome
before realizing its potential. It needs a more articulate theory of lawyer operations. There
has been some development in this area, see Probert & Brown, Theories and Practices in
the Legal Profession, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 447 (1966); Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyer's
Operations, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301 (1961), but almost all of this work remains to be done.
12. I do not intend my analysis to apply to law instruction generally. Although my
conceptual framework may be adaptable to evaluating other parts of legal education, there
are significant differences between classroom instruction and one-to-one instruction. One
such difference is the classroom teacher's unique concern with avoiding a "leaderless
group." To the extent that a classroom teacher does not provide structure and direction,
the class may flounder, or even act destructively with respect to instructional ends. This
concern about leading will influence the teacher's judgments about how long to engage in
dialogue before summarizing, with whom to speak, at what concept and language level to
aim discussion, and how to maintain nonspeaker mental participation in the class. These
concerns will often cause the teacher to behave differently in conversation than he would
if only one other person were present.
In addition, classroom teachers, particularly in the second and third years, are
less interested in helping students to practice legal analysis than in transmitting a body of
information (settled doctrine, conceptual frameworks, intellectual technique, lore) about
their subjects. Choices of with whom to speak, for how long, and the like, are made
primarily with an eye toward the orderly and sophisticated articulation of this
information, not toward the development of individual student analytical skills. Because it
is a different enterprise to engage in legal problem-solving than to lay an informational
foundation, classroom teachers will make use of different instructional techniques from
practice supervisors. Thus, the same analysis of teaching interaction may have different
implications for substantive law and clinical practice instruction. Substantive law
teaching and practice teaching also have many attributes in common. See Condlin, supra
note 3, at 9-11.
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explanations. 13 Even descriptions that use familiar language and
concepts, plausibly can be interpreted in ways that are different from
those intended.
1 4
Language itself is a second source of ambiguity. When a person
transforms a thought into words, his entire meaning does not come
through. Words are less precise, and less rich, than ideas and feelings; a
verbal statement represents only a part of the underlying thoughts and
emotions.' This problem exists in proportion to the speaker's skill at
articulation, but is always present.
Ambiguity also is produced by conventions and norms that regulate
instructional discourse to promote values other than clarity. For
example, knowledge of motive is important in understanding
13. For sophisticated discussions of the way that people explain reality to themselves,
see G. BATESON, MIND AND NATURE 114-18 (1979); P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 129-83 (1966); F. HAYECK, THE COUNTER REVOLUTION OF
SCIENCE 49-50 (1979); Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, 13
INQUIRY 360 passim (1970). For another description of this process, drawing on the
literature of neurolinguistic programming, see J. Barkai, A New Model for Legal
Communication: Sensory Experience and Representational Systems 2-26 (unpublished
manuscript) (copy on file with R. Condlin). See also Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and
Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676
(1979) (discussing the influence of institutional and systematic factors on the social
construction process using statutory and literary interpretation as examples).
For illustrations of the pervasiveness of the ambiguity phenomenon, see Hoffman,
The Crisis in the West, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 17, 1980, at 71 (describing how multiple
interpretations of the same data permeate East-West international relations); Derrida,
Limited Inc. Abc, 2 GLYPH, JOHNS HOPKINS TEXTUAL STUDIES 181-91 (1977) (discussing the
multiple, even contradictory, interpretations made of the same textual data by Jacques
Derrida and John Searle).
14. See A. SMITH, COGNITIVE STYLES IN LAW SCHOOLS 3-9 (1979). For the description of
a promising methodology for investigating the "social construction" process, see E. Olson,
The Mind's Collage: Physic Composition in Adult Life (May 1976) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University). Hayeck describes the subjective character of this attributed
meaning as the quality that distinguishes the basic data of social science from the data of
natural science. See F. HAYECK, supra note 13, at 41-60.
15. For more sophisticated discussions of this very complex topic, see Derrida, supra
note 13, at 198-217; S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCHES 54-65 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as LANGER, SKETCHES]; S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 39 (1971); J. HABERMAS,
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 6-7 (1979) (and sources cited therein);
Habermas, On Systematically Distorted Communication, 13 INQUIRY 205, 210-15 (1970);
C. MUELLER, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNICATION 13-17 (1973); W. GATES (ed.), BASIC
WRITINGS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 201-02 Confessions, BK XI, Ch. XXVIII (1948).
The relationship between meaning and language is a major issue in a
considerable body of twentieth century philosophy. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, How TO DO TiHINGS
WITH WORDS (1975); J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); J. SEARLE, SPEECHI ACTS (1969);
W. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW (1961); L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (1958). In its philosophical dimensions, this issue is not only much more
complicated than the text suggests, but also well beyond the scope of this article.
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meaning.1 6 A teacher's purpose gives his statements emphasis, nuance,
or even content that words alone do not convey, yet often conventions
and norms make it inappropriate for him to explain motive in
advance.' 7 These good reasons notwithstanding, a student's ignorance of
motive makes a teacher's statements less clear.'
8
The important point, therefore, is that how to respond to ambiguity
is a pervasive, yet often unrecognized, issue in almost all instructional
16. Perhaps the easiest illustration is classroom questioning of students. When a
teacher asks a substantive question, the student is frequently uncertain about the
question's purpose. It could be primarily to help the student to struggle with and succeed
at a learning task, to establish the fact that the teacher knows more than the student, to
impress listeners with the teacher's ability to think of provocative questions, or to emulate
the teacher's own teachers. This ambiguity is no small problem, as a high percentage of
student objection to law school centers on teacher motive, which students ordinarily
impute rather than investigate. For an example of such imputation, see Dallimore, The
Socratic Method - More Harm Than Good, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 177 (1977). For considerably
more sophisticated examples, see Kennedy, supra note 4, at 72-75; Stone, supra note 4, at
401-05.
17. E.g., explaining motives can take a long time and cause one person to dominate
the discussion; a speaker's understanding of his motives could be inaccurate or partial, so
that efforts to describe them unilaterally would mislead; or the listener could be
uninterested in motive.
18. Just as there are factors that increase ambiguity, there are those that reduce it.
One factor that reduces ambiguity is context. The stylized language of argument
associated with classroom discussion has a different meaning at social gatherings with
non-law-students. For examples of such stylized language, see the student's opening
statement and the teacher's two closing statements in the transcript at text accompanying
notes 67 and 68 infra. For an interesting discussion of the way in which context influences
understanding, see G. BATESON, supra note 13, at 114-23; Mishler, Meaning in Context: Is
There Any Other Kind? 49 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (criticism of social science
theoretical work for trying to formulate general laws that are "context independent"). See
also Kinder & Weiss, In Lieu of Rationality, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 707 (1978) (a
collection of criticisms of the rationality paradigm of social science, which abstracts data
from context, and an attempt to formulate an alternative paradigm); H. MARCUSE,
ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 170-99 (1964) (criticism of positivist philosophy as insufficiently
empirical because of its neglect of historical context); T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF
PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 12 (1977) (description of the theory of the interconnected-
ness of all things).
Other factors reducing ambiguity are: prior relationship; complexity of the subject
matter; relative status, power, responsibility, and maturity of the participants; and the
compatibility of conversational styles. See, e.g., Neely, The Unmaking of the Legal
Technocrat, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 216 (1977).'
If there is a body of basic literature that everyone has read, then communication is
facilitiated by inclusion by reference of highly complex ideas. One is capable, for
example, of explaining a highly complicated interpersonal relationship by the simple
statement: "It is like the relationship between Swann and Odette." In a community in
which most people have read Swann's Way, the statement is concise. If the analogy
between the real and fictional situations is accurate, the statement quickly explains a
complex relationship far more accurately than detailed discussion.




dialogue.1 9 There are two pure types of response, here designated the
persuasion mode and the learning mode.2" The persuasion mode is a
response to ambiguity in which a person is concerned primarily with
asserting or developing his own conception of the meaning of the
ambiguity. The learning mode is a response in which a person is
concerned more with investigating, understanding, and clarifying the
ambiguity in an interdependent fashion.2 1 These modes are comprised of
19. This point cannot be overstated. It rarely occurred to the teachers and students I
observed that what they heard in conversations was as much assumption and attribution
as it was recognition of meaning. Listening in this way was so ingrained that to think of
listening differently was a difficult proposition. It should be added that this problem of
ambiguity in communication is fundamental, not derivative or parasitic. Ambiguity exists
not solely as a result of "defects" in speech skills or language, that someday will be
"cured," but also because the experience of reality, by its nature, consists of constant and
unavoidable interpretation if meaning is to be produced at all. See Abraham, supra note
13, at 689-90. I am indebted to Gary Bellow for helping me see the centrality of the
concept of ambiguity to my analytical framework.
20. "Persuasion" and "learning" are emotionally evocative words, and may be
pejorative to some people. Some readers, therefore, may attribute a subtle bias to this
choice of terms, inferring an authorial preference for the behaviors of one or the other
mode. See C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 81-110 (1944) (labeling the process of
biasing a reader's reaction to definitions by using emotionally charged words "persuasive
definition"). I do not have this preference and do not intend to communicate this bias. In
my view, the persuasion and learning modes complement rather than compete with one
another, and law teachers and students ought to be able to move between and combine the
modes as the situation requires.
No reader of this article in manuscript form has believed this assertion. This
could be for two reasons. I do not yet differentiate sufficiently between unsocial (for
example, abusing others gratuitously) uses of the persuasion mode on the one hand, of
which most would disapprove, and strategic (see note 54 supra) and structuring uses (for
example, deciding preliminary and ancillary issues in conversations unilaterally to focus
discussion) on the other, of which most would approve. For illustrations of possible
strategic and structuring uses, see notes 42 and 45 infra. I plan to discuss these
distinctions in more detail in a future article.
The second reason has to do with the way the article may conflate two main
points. The first point is that there are two modes of discourse present in and appropriate
to clinical practice instruction, each of which is adapted to certain circumstances and
purposes, and when used otherwise, is more harmful than helpful. The second point is that
clinical teachers use one mode - the persuasion mode - most of the time, even when it is
inappropriate. Because I am usually criticizing use of the persuasion mode, it may appear
that I do not approve of it under any circumstances. This is not the case. It just happens
that overuse of the persuasion mode is the particular problem in my data.
Another possible source of reader difficulty with the terms persuasion and
learning lies in the terms themselves. These words have connotations in everyday
discourse not always intended by the specialized usage in this article. One effect of this is
that the article will sometimes seem to use persuasion and learning in contradictory ways.
For example, the processes of "persuasion" and "learning" (in the ordinary sense)
necessarily involve the use of both learning and persuasion mode behavior. I do not think
that these uses are contradictory, but recognize that they may be confusing. On occasion
this may require close reader attention to avoid attributing more meaning than I have
intended to communicate.
21. While this model is based on the work of Argyris and Sch6n, see note 22 infra, the
dualistic notion of interactional modes has ample historical precedent. For example, Sir
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different types of behaviors and are based on different values and
beliefs. Yet they also blend together at their edges as two parts of a
whole.2 2 More importantly, the modes are intellectual constructs rather
than literal descriptions of reality; they are abstractions within which to
Francis Bacon recognized and employed the distinction between the two modes, labeling
them the magistral method and the initiative method: "The magistral method teaches; the
initiative intimates. The magistral requires that what is told should be believed; the
initiative that it should be examined." F. BACON, DE AUGMENTIS SCIENTIARUM (1623),
quoted in Introduction to F. BACON, A SELECTION OF His WORKS 4 (S. Warhaft ed. 1965).
22. The two modes taken together represent a conceptual framework for evaluating
the effectiveness of practice instruction. In developing this framework, I have tried to
avoid two problems: scientism, that is, defining the world of experience in terms of only
those aspects of it that can be observed physically and measured with mathematic-like
precision, see Chomsky, The Case Against BF. Skinner, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 30, 1971,
at 18; F. HAYECK, supra note 13, at 19-24; see also R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 190 (1976) (alternate but complementary definition of
scientism); H. MARCUSE, supra note 18, at 12-14 (describing same process as operation-
alism); C. MUELLER, supra note 15, at 108-12 (discussion of the ideological properties of
scientism); D. BAKAN, ON METHOD xi-xv (1974) (description of difference between
scientistic and scientific research), and motivism, that is, defining the world of experience
in terms of all interpretations possible from a metapsychology, see W. BOOTH, MODERN
DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT 24-25 (1974); see also Leff, Economic Analysis of
Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 458 (1974). Thus, I have
included as data the underlying thoughts and feelings of participants (see note 70 and
accompanying text infra) as well as their literal words, but I have not analyzed this data
from a set of interpretive concepts, such as the ego defense mechanisms of dynamic
psychology. The use of interpretive psychological categories does not necessarily entail
motivism. But the context, purposes, and resources (including participant abilities) of most
interactions of law school and law practice do not auger well for sophisticated
psychological analysis. It is my plan, ultimately, to extend this framework to an analysis
of lawyer interaction. See note 112 infra.
This framework is in its early stages of development, is tentatively held, and has
not been tested in law teaching settings in other than an impressionistic, albeit empirical,
way. My conceptualization of this framework began in a study of the work of Chris
Argyris, Lee Bolman, and Donald Schon, who have done a good deal of empirical testing of
a closely related framework. See, e.g., C. ARGYRIS, BEHIND THE FRONT PAGE (1974); C.
ARGYRIS, INCREASING LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS (1976) 1hereinafter cited as ARGYRISI: C.
ARGYRIS & D. SCH6N, THEORY IN PRACTICE (1974); Bolman, Learning and Lawyering: An
Approach to Education for Legal Practice, in C. COOPER & C. ALDERFER, ADVANCES IN
EXPERIENTIAL SOCIAL PROCESSES 111 (1978). I owe these people, particularly Professors
Argyris and Bolman, substantial intellectual debts. For a criticism of Argyris's and
Schon's thinking and, by extrapolation, my analysis to some extent, see Sennett, The
Boss's New Clothes, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 22, 1979, at 42, 43-44; H. MARCUSE, supra note
18, at 108-14 (criticism of the "industrial sociology" tradition within which Argyris
writes).
See also Simon, supra note 3, at 531-37 (criticizing Argyris's theory for having a
bias against politics and a tacit hostility to authority). A second important Simon article
in the last two years, Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 30, makes valuable and accurate criticisms of the
implicit theoretical content (or lack thereof) of much clinical instruction, see note 3 supra,
but it is unimaginative in its reading of Argyris. Simon ignores important elements (e.g.,
internal commitment, free choice) of Argyris's theory that do not support his (Simon's)
indictment, and does not seem to see potential links between Argyris's work and the
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order and assess teacher and student behavior.2 3 They should not be
reified. The actual behavior of any individual teacher or student will
always consist of some combination of the two modes, though emphasis
will vary from person to person and from situation to situation.
A. The Persuasion Mode
The persuasion mode has three distinct aspects. In the first aspect,
the listener attributes meaning to the ambiguous parts of a speaker's
statement, so that the listener hears a statement which he believes is
clear. In reality, however, the listener unconsciously combines the
speaker's statement and the listener's own interpretation. In the second
aspect (usually the first conscious stage), the listener privately evalu-
ates the perceived communication to determine whether he agrees or
disagrees and why. In the third aspect, the listener publicly responds2 4
to the speaker's statement. This response itself is ambiguous and brings
the mode full circle.
Attribution of meaning 25 is a private, preconscious mental process
that can take many forms, although two are most common. 26 In the
critical theory of society. See note 53 infra. Argyris does not develop these aspects of his
work (his choice), but that does not mean that they are not present. Others developed the
critical content in psychoanalytic theory, see P. ROBINSON, THE FREUDIAN LEFT 1-7 (1969);
T. MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURCEN HABERMAS 193 (1978) (and sources cited
therein), and the same might be true for Argyris's work. I might add, Simon has an
annoying tendency "to present . . . the heart of a complicated body of hard thinking in
• . . almost parodic form [perhaps] to heighten the power of [his I own critical stance." Leff,
Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1233 n.6. In that tendency he
reminds one of Susanne Langer's debater. See note 28 infra. This practice is no less
annoying because Simon acknowledges it. See Simon, supra, at 489.
23. The persuasion and learning modes are not modes of instruction in the way that
lecture, dialogue, demonstration, and interrogation are. They are modes of interaction
which cut across and are found in all modes of instruction. Moreover, the persuasion and
learning mode constructs are intended to be only heuristic devices. The test of their
usefulness is the extent to which they suggest insights about interaction that otherwise
would be unavailable. The constructs are not intended to explain all of the data in
instructional interaction, and they do not.
24. This can include an attempt not to respond.
25. The attribution process in social discourse has recently become a separate
specialty within the field of social psychology. See generally E. JONES, D. KANOUSE, H.
KELLEY, R. NISBE'rr, S. VALINS, & B. WEINER, ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF
BEHAVIOR (1972); Hansen & Donoghue, The Power of Consensus: Information Derived from
One's Own and Others' Behavior, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 294 (1977); Hansen &
Lowe, Distinctiveness and Consensus: The Influence of Behavioral Information on Actors'
and Observers' Attributions, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 425 (1976); Storms,
Videotape and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and Observers' Points of View, 27
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 165 (1973). For an interesting synopsis of the same process
in literary criticism, see Ehrenpreis, Lit. in Trouble, N.Y. REV. BooKs, June 28, 1979, at
40-41.
26. J. MARSHALL, LAW & PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 25-41 (2d ed. 1980).
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first, the listener confirms rather than tests expectations, assumptions,
and preconceived notions. A listener hears what a speaker "must have
meant" because he believes that, for example, (1) only one plausible
meaning is consistent with the speaker's language, (2) people like the
speaker always believe or say the understood meaning, or (3) the
language must be interpreted that way for the listener to make a
preplanned response.
The other common method of attributing meaning involves making
private and unilateral interpretive judgments. The listener attends to
the speaker's verbal and nonverbal communications; considers tacitly
both types of communication in the context of the problem, the setting,
and his knowledge of the speaker's past behavior on similar issues; and
makes an interpretation. This type of attribution differs from testing, a
related element in the learning mode,2 7 in that it is a private and
unilateral process. The listener does not articulate publicly his judg-
ments about speaker meaning, ask the speaker to confirm or deny these
judgments, or discuss the differences between speaker and listener
understanding of the statement. This second type of attributed meaning
often seems more trustworthy than that based on preconceptions,
because of its superficial similarity to testing.
Evaluation, the second aspect of the persuasion mode response to
ambiguity, is a conscious process in which the listener internally
appraises the speaker's statement. These internal appraisals take many
forms: for example, agreeing or disagreeing with the speaker's position;
commenting on the worth of the undertaking; or assessing the speaker's
competence to fulfill the undertaking. Evaluation is a distinctive
feature of the persuasion mode when it is an automatic and pervasive
reaction to the statements and actions of others. 28 Rather than
27. See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
28. Susanne Langer has described an academic variation of this process, the risks it
involves for learning, and one way in which those risks may be reduced.
All too many readers approach a new theory in the spirit instilled and cultivated by
the debating society of their school or college days - the forensic spirit that treats
every expositor of ideas as an opponent and seeks, above all, to refute whatever he
says, and if possible make it appear as utter nonsense. The chance that the key ideas
of any professional scholar's work are pure nonsense is small; much greater the
chance that a devastating refutation is based on a superficial reading or even a
distorted one, subconsciously twisted by the desire to refute. To attack an error is one
thing; to throw out a whole theoretical speculation because it contains an error is
another. A serious attack on a fallacious development may set it right, if that is the
critic's ambition. Such criticism is co-operative and aims at truth; and it steers its
course by checking with the proponent: Is this what you mean? Is that really what you
would say?
S. LANGER, supra note 15, at ix.
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consciously suspend judgment, seek clarification, or acknowledge confu-
sion, the listener agrees or disagrees solely on the basis of speaker
communication and listener interpretation. The listener acts as if he
believes his purposes are furthered by taking evaluative stands quickly
prior to or as a form of inquiry.
In the final aspect of the persuasion mode the listener takes public
action based upon his evaluation. His actions can include expressing his
evaluation accurately, in the language he uses to describe it to himself,
diplomatically, or in overstated terms. The listener also can attempt to
hide his evaluation by changing the subject, talking around the issue, or
ending the conversation. Whatever form it takes, the listener's public
action will itself be ambiguous and thus start the cycle anew.2 9
B. The Learning Mode
The learning mode also has three aspects: 30 inquiry, the process of
obtaining information about others' statements; owning up, the process
of sharing with others both intellectual and emotional reactions to their
statements; and testing, the process of eliciting and assessing reaction
to one's own views in order to decide whether to agree or disagree.
Inquiry is the panoply of behaviors through which one investigates
ambiguity. Through inquiry, a person discovers the detail of a position
not offered at the outset, the description of experiences on which the
position is based, the inferences or interpretations made from those
experiences, and the theoretical views that inform the speaker's
29. A variation of the persuasion mode deserves mention. Many students try to avoid
acquiring persuasion mode habits (without using that terminology) by doing the opposite
of what the mode suggests. Thus, they withdraw from law school (that is, they participate
minimally in classes, corridor conversations, and discussions with professors), see
themselves as low-key or "laid back," and take their greatest pride in comments of
strangers that they "do not sound like law students." As understandable as this reaction
is, the feeling of security that it provides is often illusory. The opposite of the persuasion
mode is not the same as the learning mode, cf. ARGYRIS, supra note 22, at 150 (acting in
opposition to "Model I" behavior does not equal progression to "Model II" behavior), and
students who believe that it is, mistake a problem of substance for a problem of form.
Talking less will not insulate one from attributing meaning or evaluating statements
prematurely, nor will it help one to learn to inquire, own up, or test. See notes 30 to 37 and
accompanying text infra. Quiet students learn the persuasion mode; they just learn it
quietly. Duncan Kennedy has insightfully described the dilemma of the quiet student. See
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 76-78.
30. The learning mode construct comes more from intellectual invention and
extrapolation than from patterns in instructional incidents. The clinical teachers in my
data rarely have acted systematically in this mode, though many used particular
behaviors from it. For a considerably more complicated discussion of the nature of
learning (in the ordinary sense) mode discourse, see McCarthy, A Theory of Communica-
tive Competence. 3 Pii.. Soc. Sci. 135. 145-48 (1973).
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judgment. Inquiry might consist of suspending judgment rather than
making statements, asking questions rather than agreeing or dis-
agreeing, or nonverbally encouraging others to continue speaking
rather than appearing ready to jump into the exchange.3 '
Owning up is sharing relevant ideas and feelings, including those
that are difficult to express, in ways that the listener can understand.3 2
This category of behavior usually includes communicating strongly held
evaluative ideas, both positive and negative, and expressing feelings
that are commonly associated with discomfort in our culture (for
example, embarrassment, confusion, pride, anger, and admiration).
Owning up does not dominate discussion, however, and is not an
automatic first response to the statements of others. When, how, and to
what one owns up is a matter of judgment rather than reflex. Some
thoughts may be new and not yet intelligible; some persons may not be
able or willing to discuss the difficult thoughts of another; some
relationships may lack time or circumstances to work through difficult
31. None ofthese behaviors is necessarily a learning mode, as even questions can make
a point rather than explore one. See R. Rorty, Method and Morality 15 (unpublished
paper) (copy on file with R. Condlin). For a catalogue of behaviors that could encourage
another to continue to speak, see A. BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEW 108-53 (2d ed.
1974).
32. This sharing is most useful when it produces intellectual and emotional dilemmas
that others identify and feel competent to resolve. A dilemma is an experience that is
perceived as a conflict in need of reconciliation between two or more important aspects of
one's world. To illustrate, when a teacher disagrees with a student about the effectiveness
of the student's performance, a dilemma exists if the student believes in the correctness of
his initial effort, his reflective judgment, and the teacher's judgment to the contrary. If the
dilemma is challenging, yet manageable, see note 97 infra, a student will work to resolve
it and, in the process, will learn.
Dilemmas occur in many forms (for example, from the urge to understand why
one succeeds, to the intellectual challenge present in crossword puzzles) but the dilemma
on which formal schooling seems to be built is the nonconfirming experience - the
experience of having someone (for example, judge, jury, teacher, friend) say, in effect, to a
student that he has partly or totally failed. This is uncomfortable for most, but even more
so for persons who prize consistency, do not like conflict, and believe that authority figures
should be taken seriously. Students who are confronted with dilemmas will not always
work to resolve them. They may deny that the dilemmas exist, suppress them, ignore
them, or distract their attention through some mental trick. These options are turned to
most commonly when dilemmas appear beyond one's ability to resolve. See note 97 infra.
The cognitive dissonance basis to this view of learning and teaching is recognizable. See L.
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-4 (1976). See also C. AIRGYRIS & D.
SCIION, supra note 22, at 6-11, 30-34; W. TORIIERT, LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 24-25
(1972).
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thoughts; and some thoughts, while accurate and difficult, may also be
irrelevant to the work at hand.33
Owning up is not the same as rapid-fire exchange in which
pejorative language (for example, characterizing another's ideas as
"absurd," "silly," "irrational," or "dumb")34 and tone carry the major
part of one's message. A person owning up often presents balanced
reactions - both positive and negative aspects of his views - and the
difficulty of owning up, if present, is itself often expressed. Most
importantly, owning up includes the articulation of direct data 35 or
evidence from which evaluative ideas arise. If such data are not
available, one's views are withheld. Owning up is only part of a total
interactional process. Unlike evaluation, which often is nearly the
whole of the persuasion mode, owning up works best in combination
with inquiry and testing. By itself, owning up usually produces
confusion, anger, and other similar feelings.
Testing, the final aspect of the learning mode, is the comparison of
one's beliefs with others' views and experiences and the measuring of
33. Owning up can also be described as "fair argument." Argument is fair when it
includes the data base, see notes 32 supra and 35 infra, from which it proceeds, is
structured to leave room for and encourage others to express contrary experiences or
theory, includes known and reasonable objections to itself not raised by others, locates
itself within larger scientific, philosophical and political traditions, avoids [ad hominem]
attack, and relies upon idea content rather than rhetorical flourish to produce
understanding rather than victory., In this respect, owning up may be similar to William
Simon's principle of non-professional advocacy - "advocate and client.., each justifying
himself to the other." Simon, supra note 22, at 133. Simon's expression captures much of
the spirit of what I intend to convey. If there is a difference between my and Simon's
construction it may be that I am more concerned than Simon with the style in which an
argument proceeds. Simon says nothing explicit about style, even insofar as it constitutes
content, but the tone he adopts to articulate his views, see note 43 infra, indicates that he
is not stylistically neutral.
34. This does not mean that these words could never represent learning mode
behavior. If the words signal unambiguously one's wish to inquire, test, and own-up (as
they might in some relationships), they would be in the learning mode. The key concept,
again, is that of ambiguity. The trouble with these words is that they are not generally
thought of as expressing curiosity or interest.
35. Direct data is a concept that is frequently abused. For example, in discussing a
student's interview of a client, it is not enough to say, "I thought that you were too tied to
your outline because on three occasions the client gave you important information outside
your questions that you did not follow up." The statement that the client gave information
that was not followed up is an interpretive judgment and not data. Direct data would be
the client's and student's specific statements. The same would be true if the teacher
paraphrased the client's and student's words. Teacher and student must understand
specifically what the client intended to communicate, and this analysis must start from
the client's and student's own words. For an illustration of the substitution of interpretive
summary and paraphrase for direct data, see, e.g., Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at
27-28. Because there will not be time in practice instruction to discuss all issues in this
detail, teachers must select representative and recurring issues and relevant supporting
data for analysis in each instructional meeting.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
both against criteria of validity.3 6 Testing includes admitting that one's
beliefs are tentative and inviting others to evaluate those beliefs,
collecting data systematically about the patterns in one's beliefs and
behaviors, candidly analyzing the data generated, working in places and
with persons likely to provide accurate feedback, and changing one's
views when faced with accurate contradictory evidence and analysis.
Testing can take many forms, depending on circumstance and personal-
ity. Some people test by prodding with argument and others by asking
questions. Both approaches work as long as ambiguity is minimized and
all parties to the exchange know that testing is taking place.
3 7
C. Additional Characteristics
Additional characteristics distinguish the persuasion from the
learning mode.3" Persuasion mode behavior is competitive rather than
additive, private rather than public, self-protective rather than risk-
taking, and rational rather than emotional.3 9 In their application these
characteristics sometimes overlap and occur in combination, and in
their definition as concepts they sometimes blur together. Yet each pair
36. For a description of one such (compatible) criterion, see McCarthy, supra note 30,
at 141-45.
37. There is no perfect combination of the elements of the learning mode. They circle
in and out of one another in so many ways that drawing generalized blueprints for their
use is not possible. What will work best in particular situations will require judgments
about circumstance, setting, personality, and objective. In addition, the learning mode
changes the focus in conversations from opening statements to subsequent analysis.
Because a speaker will not be able to put a point unambiguously, it matters not so much
how he puts it initially as how he develops it in response to listener reaction. In this mode,
complicated substantive points are seen as communicated through a series of statements,
back and forth between speakers, rather than in comprehensive and perfectly put opening
remarks.
38. Recall that those terms identify constructs of pure types of behavior and are
intended as definitional rather than descriptive for purposes of my analysis. See notes 20
to 23 and accompanying text supra.
39. For each set of additional characteristics, I have used labeling words from
ordinary usage. Throughout, however, I intend these words to be words of art, with
specified narrow definitions. I use dichotomous categories to illustrate. I do not say that
they capture the complexity of the reality they identify. See Ferrarotti, The Destiny of
Reason and the Paradox of the Sacred, 46 Soc. REs. 648, 650-54 (1979). See also R. RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND TTIE MIRROR OF NATURE 17-69 (1979) (discussing the inadequacy of
dualistic thinking about knowing). To their credit, dichotomous categories make
dialectical reasoning possible. Cf Heilbroner, The Dialectical Vision, TIlE N:w REPLHI.IC,
Mar. 1, 1980, at 25-26 (discussing the advantages of dialectical reasoning).
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identifies a discrete distinction between persuasion and learning mode
interaction.4 0
Persuasion mode behavior is competitive4' when a speaker, for the
sake of being impressive, tries to produce more ideas, with greater
eloquence, conviction, and self-assurance than other parties to the
conversation. 42 There are some familiar though not inevitable earmarks
40. Two important qualifications should be re-emphasized. First, both learning and
persuasion mode behavior can produce "learning" and "persuasion" in the ordinary sense
of those terms. See note 20 supra. Second, almost any activity of teachers or students can
fall into either the learning or persuasion mode, depending upon the context. See note 34
and accompanying text supra.
41. For a recent discussion of "competitiveness" in law school generally, see Schwartz,
How Can Legal Education Respond to Changes in the Legal Profession, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
440, 444-47 (1978). Professor Schwartz is correct when he says that student competitive-
ness is attributable to more than the socializing effect of contentious law school dialogue.
On the other hand, he may miss the point that more than competitiveness is involved in
law student adversarial style, and, more importantly, that it does not matter so much who
is to blame for this interactional style, as it does who can help to understand and control
it. See also Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and
Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 258-70 (1974) (and sources cited therein).
On the point of law school socialization and the power of teacher behavior to
influence student beliefs, attitudes, and values, see Barry & Connelly, Research on Law
Students: An Annotated Bibliography, 1978 A.B.F. RES. J. 751; Erlanger & Klegon,
Socialization Effects of Professional School, 13 LAW & Soc. REV. 11 (1978) (and sources
cited therein); Rathjen, The Impact of Legal Education on the Beliefs, Attitudes and Values
of Law Students, 44 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1976); Schwartz, Law, Lawyers, and Law School:
Perspectives From the First Year Class, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1980); Stevens, Law
Schools and Law Students, 59 Va. L. Rev. 551, 585-86, 681-82 (1973) (and sources cited
therein). For a summary of the current theories of law school socialization, see Pipkin,
Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 A.B.F.
RES. J. 247, 256-72. For a summary of research on value and personality changes among
law students, see Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of
Career-Relevant Interests, Attitudes and Personality Traits Among First Year Law
Students, 1979 A.B.F. RES. J. 791, 798-806.
42. Competitive dialogue is designed to coerce rather than inform. Dialogue is
coercive when it relies heavily on factors other than the weight of reasons to convince
others to agree. A common example is the situation in which a person refuses to accept an
understanding listener's good faith disagreement and continues to make the same
argument, often in different language or with greater emotional force. Cf. Habermas,
Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power, 44 Soc. RES. 3, 4 (1977) (discussing
philosophical objections to coercive dialogue). There are instances in practice instruction
when coercive behavior would be appropriate. For example, if a student fails to contact a
client to close material gaps in the client's story and the deadline for filing pleadings
approaches, the teacher may raise his voice or tie the failure to contact the client to some
external sanction. These actions are coercive, in that they are threats rather than new
substantive arguments about the correctness of contacting the client but would often be
appropriate for letting the student know that client interest in competent representation
takes priority over student freedom to choose whether to be competent. See note 45 infra.
For a thoughtful discussion of the coercion concept in the context of "indoctrina-
tion" as used in moral psychology, see Oldenquist, Moral Education Without Moral
Education, 49 HARV. EDUC. REv. 240, 245 (1979).
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of competitive dialogue: long, well-edited, soliloquy-like statements;
dense, complicated substantive positions; rapid pace; intimidating
expression; and automatic, rapid-fire rebuttals of contrary views.43 By
contrast, additive behavior consists of sharing ideas to produce joint
intellectual products without regard to authorship.*4 A person who acts
additively draws others out by listening to, questioning, or reinforcing
others' statements. He supplements others' ideas by revealing analogous
experiences and insights to the extent they modify or augment those
ideas. Gratuitous demonstrations of erudition, redundant explication or
rephrasing of points already made, and interminable soliloquies are
avoided.4 5
43. Competitive reactions to others' ideas occur even in legal scholarship. For
example, the wish to compete may explain William Simon's strong reaction to Charles
Fried's provocative article on lawyer role. See Simon, supra note 22, at 106-13; Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976). In a generally thoughtful article, Simon's critique of Fried is strident in
proportion to the analytical objections Simon makes. Simon's analysis is correct. Fried
trivializes friendship by making it nonreciprocal, and does not provide for the exercise of
lawyer autonomy, except to subordinate that autonomy to another. See Fried, supra, at
1066-67, 1071. To his credit, however, Fried identifies friendship as an appropriate
metaphor for lawyer-client relations, see id., and his discussion of the metaphor is the first
philosophically serious analysis of lawyer role. Cf. Professional Responsibility: Report of
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958) (lawyer's allegiance is to a set of adversary
procedures that constitute a dialectical decision process); Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951) (lawyer's allegiance is to pure craft). Simon seems to agree with
Fried's choice of metaphor, see Simon, supra note 22, at 112-13, 133, so the tone of
Simon's attack is hard to explain. Possibly he wanted to replace rather than add to Fried's
analytic framework. Seeing the relationship between one's own and others' views as
either-or, rather than complementary or developmental, is a common characteristic of
competitive discourse.
The cause of Simon's seeming anger is, no doubt, more complicated than this. My
point is that the tone of Simon's comments may discourage Fried from considering them.
For many, in fact (and there is circumstantial evidence about Fried, see Freid, Author's
Reply, 86 YALE L.J. 584 (1977) (response to a critical article, finding it "querulas"),
Simon's tone would make dialogue seem pointless. I might add, Fried seems willing to
learn. In a subsequent public discussion of the friendship analogy Fried modified his
position in the direction of criticisms that Simon and others had made. See C. FRIED, RIGHT
AND WRONG 179 (1978).
44. In the additive view, the social relationship rather than the single individual is
the principal instrument of intellectual production. This view of intellectual exchange is
most commonly associated with scholarship in the natural sciences, though this
association is sometimes more theory than practice. See, e.g., J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE
HELIX (1968); R. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 286-324 (1973).
45. The relationship between competitiveness and additiveness, as with all the sets of
additional characteristics, is more complicated. For example, in writing a memorandum of
law to a court, a teacher and a student must identify the possible ways in which the issues
may be argued. Each person's ideas must be drawn out, elaborated on, and supplemented
by the other - an additive task. When brief-writing reaches the stage at which a unifying
theme must be chosen and editing done, each person must express preferences and argue
for the wisdom of his choices. To the extent that these choices are mutually exclusive and
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Persuasion mode behavior is private in that one tries to convince
others while minimally disclosing one's motives or purposes. Like the
person who has no movie preference until the group chooses against his
wishes, private people keep their full range of objectives secret until it
becomes necessary or opportune to act to protect them.4 6 Consideration
of others' ideas is reserved for private moments and the fruit of this
private reflection is infrequently shared or tested, except implicitly in
the form of changed or confirmed views in the future. Because of this
behavior, others often must guess at a persuasion mode speaker's plans
or beliefs.4 7 By contrast, public behavior consists of maximum articula-
tion (under the circumstances) of relevant thought. Tentative or
ill-formed ideas are expressed, although described as tentative or
ill-formed. One shares uncertainty, confusion, indecision, and curiosity
in the hope of triggering clarifying responses or useful suggestions.
Issues of group objectives and strategies are raised directly rather than
indirectly. Motives and purposes are not concealed and colleagues are
not forced to guess at their content.
Persuasion mode behavior is self-protective in that undeveloped and
uncomfortable thoughts are suppressed and positions are taken only
when they can be defended fluently and fully. Self-protective behavior
also occurs when the limits of experience, insight, and understanding
are concealed except when concealing them would be a more negative
are strongly held, this could be a competitive task. Moreover, if one of the parties were to
decide that identifying possible arguments is unquestionably the right place to begin, he
might react competitively to any suggestion to begin elsewhere. He would, in effect,
compete in order to be additive. In this competition over agenda, he might act coercively,
unilaterally, and self-protectively, and his decision to do this, viewed from a state of
perfect knowledge, might be correct. In such decisions there is considerable risk of
self-contradiction and a thorny conceptual problem of when learning (in the ordinary
sense) justifies the use of persuasion mode behavior. (In part, this is a problem of defining
the relationship between one's political and psychological theories of law practice. Simon
has described the inadequacy of clinical scholarship on this issue. See Simon, supra note 3,
passim.) Habermas discusses this problem under the concept of "strategic action," see note
53 infra, but I do not treat the issue in this article.
46. In a further elaboration, a person who acts privately often does not take
responsibility for his actions. In the persuasion mode, people analyze the success or failure
(usually failure) of events in which they are implicated without regard to their own role in
those events. The best law school example of this disassociative behavior occurs after a
particularly bad class. The teacher charges that students did not respond to questioning
and that this passivity squelched developing dialogue. Students charge that teacher
questioning was too simple, confused, or complex. For an exception to this pattern and a
thoughtful discussion on taking responsibility in law learning relationships, see Brest, On
My Teaching, STAN. LAW., Spring/Summer 1979, at 23.
47. David Bakan has described this behavior pattern as the "mystery-mastery"
complex: mastery of others is achieved, in part, by maintaining mystery about oneself. See
D. BAKAN, supra note 22, at 37-49 (1967). See also W. TORIERT, supra note 32, at 12.
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comment on one's intelligence than the ignorance itself. By contrast, in
the learning mode one regularly raises topics that involve strong
feelings or produce conflicts, examines questions without prior know-
ledge of the outcome, speculates publicly about ideal systems that have
no immediate pragmatic application, and returns to difficult issues
rather than seeks paths of less resistance.4 s
Finally, persuasion mode behavior is rational in that it limits
communication to the world of ideas.49 Ideas are the only topics
discussed and only idea statements are made. Relevant feelings are
either intellectualized or suppressed. 50 The learning mode also is
respectful of ideas, but as they are embodied in feelings. 5 ' Feeling is
both an appropriate topic for discussion and a proper form of com-
munication. It need not be translated into idea statements to be
useful.5 2
48. There is a special variation of this distinction between self-protection and
risk-taking. In a limited way, the persuasion mode is self-sealing rather than self-
reflective. In the persuasion mode there is an avoidance of conversation about
conversation - an absence of critical reflection on how one knows. Knowledge is thought
of as having a fixed content, capable of being grasped with certainty, and existing
objectively in the universe independent of the process through which it is known. Cf. note
18 supra. By contrast, in the learning mode, persons study not only what they know, but
how they know it.
49. Because there is no affectively neutral way to speak, this is, in a sense,
impossible. One will be serious, indifferent, whimsical, angry, sad, suspicious, or guarded,
and these feelings to some extent will be apparent to a listener. It is, however, possible to
control the topics about which one speaks and the literal contents of one's words.
50. See, e.g., Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 250-51, 260-62 (1978). For an interesting discussion of the ideological
tensions inherent in the rational-emotional dichotomy, see Lehman, supra note 10, at
1082-83, 1091-96.
51. As used here, the term "feeling" is an umbrella concept for human behavior and
includes both thinking and feeling. See generally S. LANGER, SKETCHES, supra note 15, at
8-11.
52. This completes the description of my conceptual framework. The relationship
between stage I (the "attribution-inquiry" cycle) and stage II (the "additional-
characteristic" dichotomies) is not as clear as it needs to be. In a sense, stage I describes
the ways in which meaning is constructed in clinical practice communication, and stage II
describes the ways in which this same meaning is responded to. Because constructing
meaning is often and ultimately the same process as responding to meaning, there is also
an overlap in my description of these two stages. Single pieces of behavior fit easily and
simultaneously into categories in both stages. I want to retain the meaning/constructing
- meaning/responding distinction for the present because each process contributes in a
different way to the communication difficulties in practice instruction. A conceptual
framework that separates the two stages, I believe, will produce more insight than a
framework that collapses the two stages into one. I recognize, however, that the
definitional relationship between the two stages needs a good deal of development.
There is another point about this framework which should be mentioned. The
framework is obviously inadequate as a theoretical statement about persuasion and
learning. On the nature of theory, see ARGYvIS, supra note 22, at 3-19; R. BERNSTEIN, TIlE
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The persuasion and learning modes 3 help to achieve com-
plementary but different ends and are only partly interchangeable.
When either mode is used in an unsuitable setting, ineffective and even
harmful behavior can result. For example, even when interaction in a
relationship is cordial and supportive, exclusive use of the persuasion
mode is destructive of learning (in the ordinary sense) because the
mode's pervasive evaluation of others and of self triggers uncomfortable
feelings which cannot be discussed. To minimize these feelings,
participants break off conversations sooner, talk about fewer and safer
topics, and form fewer relationships that run the risk of creating
discomfort. For many, the, emotional costs of learning from certain
people are judged as worth less than the intellectual benefits.
RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 11-16 (1976); M. BLOOM, THE PARADOX
OF HELPING 53-67 (1975); S. TOULMIN, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: THE COLLECTIVE USE AND
EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTS 123-26 (1972). I have not yet tried to write theory, but have
instead tried to identify communication patterns of clinical teachers that have negative
effects on student learning, and whose presence has not previously been acknowledged.
The persuasion/learning mode framework is mostly a construct within which to organize
these comments.
53. There is another dimension to the foregoing framework, alluded to earlier, see
notes 3, 13, 15, 36, 42, and 45 supra, which ought to be identified explicitly but whose
development is beyond the scope of this article. The learning and persuasion mode
construct may be the seeds from which a critical theory of law learning and perhaps
practice, see note 112 infra, and which Jirgen Habermas lays the metatheoretical
foundations. See generally J. HABERMAS, supra note 15; J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND
HUMAN INTERESTS (1971); J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975); J. HABERMAS, THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1973). See also R. BERNSTEIN, SUPRA note 22, at 185-225; T. McCarthy,
supra note 22, passim. Habermas grounds his "critical" theory of society (i.e., theory which
does not accept prevailing ideas, actions, and social conditions, but seeks to improve them,
in part, through a self-conscious understanding of the ideological constraints which
influence one's understanding of the social world and through the use of transcendental
critical principles, see R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 173-85; J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE
AND HUMAN INTERESTS supra, at 310) in the dialogic interaction of self-reflective and
communicatively competent subjects. In a three-tiered theoretical construct, Habermas
argues that communicative competence is linked to the moral and social development of
the individual and the political evolution of society. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 15, at
xvii. Habermas bases his theory on an epistomology which insists that knowledge is
grounded in fundamental human interests and identifies three such interests and the
types of thinking to which they give rise: (1) technical knowledge produced by the
empirical/analytical sciences - which gives rise to reason that is means-oriented, its
object being the manipulation and control of objectified processes; (2) practical knowledge
associated with the historical/cultural sciences - which gives rise to reason that is
ends-oriented, its object being understanding and consensus; (3) emancipatory knowledge
associated with the critical social sciences - which gives rise to reason that is
self-reflective, its object being the dissolution of internal and external ideological
constraints on understanding. See J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, suPra,
at 195-98, 308-11.
My framework connects with Habermas's model in several ways, but the most
fundamental point of congruence is in my assertion that instrumental or technical
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Use of only the persuasion mode also causes information shared in
work discussions to be incomplete and untrustworthy. When the
primary underlying concerns are protecting self and securing agree-
ment, people convey fewer and more defensible ideas and express more
thinking predominates in clinical instructional interaction almost to the exclusion of
self-reflective and practical reasoning. See J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 75
(1970).
Other points of connection include a similarity between inappropriate use of the
persuasion mode and what Habermas calls "systematically distorted communication." See
J. HABERMAS, supra note 15, at 205-07. Distorted communication occurs when ideological
constraints operate in conversation to create illusory consensus but at the same time make
genuine consensus impossible. Id.; T. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at 145. See also H.
MARCUSE, supra note 18, at 84-120, 145-48 (describing how distorted communication
closes the universe of discourse).
In addition, the learning mode may correspond to Habermas's notions of the ideal
speech situation. See T. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at 145-48. Like Habermas's model, the
learning mode presupposes that understanding and consensus can be arrived at by
dialogical interaction between self-reflective and communicatively competent subjects, but
that for this to happen many existing interaction patterns must be critically transformed.
J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 17-19.
Once a consensus is reached, communicative interaction often will give way to
strategic action, which, for Habermas, means the struggle for political power and
influence. See J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 33, 39. For me, strategic
action may describe the appropriate use of the persuasion mode (based on the "consensus"
arrived at by the use of the learning mode) in the adversarial aspects of the interactions of
learning and lawyering. See note 45 supra.
Habermas's work, while preliminary by his own description, see J. HABERMAS,
supra note 15, at xvi, is too sophisticated and subtle to be described adequately in this
note. I plan to write more about the connections between Habermas's system and my own
system in a future article. I am grateful to Joseph Keefe for help in synopsizing these
points of possible connection.
The pragmatism of Richard Rorty is a more modest but, perhaps, a more
defensible metatheory into which the learning and persuasion mode construct may fit.
Rorty rejects Habermas's use of transcendental principles, critical or otherwise, see R.
Rorty, Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism 19 (Presidential Address, given on Dec.
29, 1979, to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association) (copy on file
R. Condlin), rejects the "absolute conception of reality," see R. Rorty, supra note 31, at 4,
and holds that the distinctions between fact and value, science and morality, and
description and evaluation are unhelpful. See also T. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at 179-93
(describing an ongoing debate between Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer over the
possibility of and necessity for transcendent critical principles). Rorty sees these views as
"reactionary" shibboleths, R. Rorty, supra note 31, at 10, a residue of a "neurotic
Cartesian quest for certainty which [was] one result of Galileo's frightening new
cosmology . ..one reaction to Darwin and .. .the neo-Kantian response to Hegelian
historicism." R. Rorty, Pragmatism, supra, at 3. Along with William James, Rorty holds
that "truth is not the sort of thing which has an essence"; that, instead, "it is the
vocabulary of practice rather than of theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which
one can say something useful about truth." For the pragmatist, "the pattern of all inquiry
• . . is deliberation concerning the relative attraction of various concrete alternatives.
• . .It is the urge to answer questions like 'Why believe what I take to be true?' and 'Why
do what I take to be right?' by appealing to something more than the ordinary, retail,
detailed, concrete reasons which have brought one to one's present view"; "there are no
wholesale constraints on inquiry . . . - derived from the nature of the objects, or of the
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commitment to those ideas than they may in fact have.5 4 This
commitment may influence others not to pursue issues further. Yet the
speaker may prefer, and the wiser course for learning may be, further
dialogue.
The persuasion mode's emphasis on rationality removes from work
dialogues much of the emotional insight of participants. An example of
such insight is an intuitive reaction that a particular approach will not
work or that a particular outcome is wrong. These intuitions are only
sometimes accurate, but often signal the need for more analysis. Left
unexplored they linger to influence discussion in inexplicit and
sometimes unhelpful ways.
By not permitting its discussion, the persuasion mode intensifies
emotion often to such a point that it distracts attention from the
intellectual work at hand. The mode's argumentative style encourages
focusing too quickly on single, simple explanations for complex phe-
nomena, rather than generating and testing more sophisticated hypoth-
eses. The premium the mode places on taking and defending positions
causes people to concentrate on the quality of their own comments often
to the detriment of hearing the valuable aspects of others' statements.5 5
The learning mode is similarly limited where the goal is persuasion
(in the ordinary sense). Its methods are often too slow and open-ended to
maintain the interest of those to be persuaded. A tentative attitude
mind, or of the language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our
fellow inquirers. . . .The only sense in which we are constrained to truth is that . . . we
can make no sense of the notion that the view which can survive all objections might be
false." R. Rorty, Pragmatism, supra, at 3-9.
Rorty's views are also more sophisticated than this, but a full description of them
is beyond the scope of this note. See generally R. RORTY, supra note 39, for a
comprehensive statement of Rorty's views. In the long run, I suspect that Rorty is closer
than Habermas to providing a philosophical dimension to Argyris's technical theories. See
note 22 supra. For purposes of my own views, it is too soon to say. I am indebted to David
Luban for introducing me to Rorty's work.
54. See Deutch, Conflicts: Postive and Destructive, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 161-62 (D. Johnson ed. 1973). These patterns are present in each of the instructional
dialogues discussed. See notes 67 to 100 and accompanying text infra.
55. Perhaps the most damaging effect of the persuasion mode on learning is that it
(the persuasion mode) retards the development of critical consciousness. See note 53 supra.
Passing on information, see note 12 supra, may be unimpeded and even helped by
persuasion mode dialogue. But obtaining critical perspective on how and what one knows
(so as not to be the captive of ideology, one's own or others') requires a responsible,
self-reflective, and biltiteral learning style. Other people are needed to help identify and
dissect one's defenses to learning. At the same time, control of the process of progressing
beyond defenses must be shared by the one who is defensive. This is because becoming
autonomous (a requirement of effective instruction, see note 1 supra) requires the taking




accompanies the learning mode, which may convey a lack of
conviction.56 The mode also disappoints those who believe that problems
have right answers capable of being transferred in a limited number of
declarative sentences. In many settings where law-trained people must
operate (for example, courts), the need to make decisions quickly, the
inevitable absence of perfect information, and an aversion to risk-taking
endemic to such settings, cause decision-makers to use criteria of
decision-making that would be thought superficial in less constrained
settings. Simplistic arguments delivered forcefully and quickly often
convince more readily than sophisticated ones that are more difficult
and time consuming to comprehend.5 7 The learning mode takes minimal
account of these factors and thus leads to ineffective performance in
such settings.
58
In addition to doing the work for which they are principally
adapted, the persuasion and learning modes5 9 also regularly do the
work of each other. New insights, perspectives, and analytical struc-
tures are often a product of adversarial exchange. Similarly, the
deliberate, detailed, and open-ended exploration of new substantive
ideas can ultimately persuade and, in some circumstances, is the only
method of discourse that could produce that result. This overlap
notwithstanding, the two modes are not interchangeable - neither does
the job of the other as well or as often as it does its own.60
56. Cf. E. Loj-rus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979) (discussing the relative
importance of speaker conviction in the persuasion process).
57. Not all courtroom argument is simplistic, forcefully stated, and quick. Most
courtroom exchange contains some learning mode behavior and in some instances such
behavior can predominate. Nevertheless, in the ordinary litigation of entry level courts
widespread learning mode behavior would be confusing indeed. For a discussion of this
litigation process, see ROUGH JUSTICE 153-344 (J. Robertson ed. 1974); Harris, Annals of
Law in Criminal Court (pts. 1&2), NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 21, 1973, passim; Neely, supra
note 18, at 220-21.
58. Put another way, there are worlds in which persuasion mode behaviors are the
norm, and operating effectively in these worlds requires the use of these behaviors. It
might be better if these worlds could be more in the learning mode, but often they are not,
and are not likely to be within the time frame in which a lawyer must act. See Bellow &
Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest
Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 384-86 (1978).
59. It is important to remember that the persuasion-learning mode construct is only a
typology of means. Nowhere in the article is there an equivalent typology of ends, a
'1politics" of practice instruction. See Simon, supra note 3, passim. Ends are implicit at
several points, see, e.g., notes 1, 53 and 58 supra and notes 60 and 101 infra and text
accompanying notes 38 to 52 supra and notes 88 to 97 infra, but ultimately they must be
stated more explicitly and systematically.
60. It should also be noted that one can learn the learning and persuasion modes in
one of two ways. In the first, one understands the nature of each mode, sees it as a means
rather than an end, and performs it proficiently. Ineffectiveness arises if one uses the
mode where inappropriate. In the second variation, one sees the mode as an end in itself,
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Clinical practice instruction should teach about and through the
learning and persuasion modes.61 This is because persuasion62 and
learning mode skills63 are needed in the interpersonal tasks of law
performed for its own sake rather than as a means to other substantive ends. One does not
recognize this explicitly, but simply does not understand beyond the technique dimension
of the behavior. In this second situation, the performance of the chosen mode frequently is
overdrawn and ends up caricaturing the properties of the original mode itself. The
caricatured use of the learning and persuasion modes is a more blatant problem, but the
inappropriate use may be more widespread.
61. See Cox, The Lawyer's Independent Calling, 67 Ky. L.J. 5, 14-25 (1978-79)
(discussing how good law practice requires a careful blending of the substance of these two
modes). See also Jones, Lawyers & Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L.
REV. 957 (1977-78).
62. I must admit to nagging doubts about the term "persuasion." Often it seems a
misnomer. In many circumstances described as persuasion-oriented, control, manipula-
tion, or influence seems a more accurate characterization of what is intended. For
example, arguing a motion will not always require that the judge be "persuaded" with
respect to the ultimate wisdom of one's substantive analysis. It is enough that the judge
grant the motion, substantive ignorance or error notwithstanding, and all efforts to
convince are ended when the motion is granted. This difficulty notwithstanding, the term
"persuasion" is retained for two reasons. First, a person acting in the persuasion mode is
trying to persuade in the literal sense. In the argument on a motion, for example, the
advocate always is trying to persuade the judge to perform the physical act of signing the
order granting the motion. This is a limited form of persuasion, no doubt, but nonetheless
an attempt to persuade. Second, persuasion is a positive term for people trained in law. It
has fewer pejorative associations than manipulation or control, and this may aid in seeing
the persuasion mode as an integral part of a total theory of lawyering relations.
63. The word "skills" also may have unfortunate associations. There is a view of
clinical instruction that its principal purpose is to train in lawyer "practical skills." See
Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects for Clinical-Legal Education, in CLINICAL EDUCATION
AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 94, 94-95 (E. Kitch ed. 1970); Gee & Jackson,
Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695,
882-84; Lowry & Kennedy, Clinical Law in the Area of Mental Health, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
373, 385. What this term means is never made clear, but one gets the feeling, perhaps
erroneously, that "skills training" is thought of as a lower order of learning. See Kitch,
Foreword to CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 5, 13-14 (E. Kitch
ed. 1970). The point is sometimes put another way; clinical instruction is said to be
"practical," and substantive law instruction "theoretical." See Finesilver, The Tension
Between Practical and Legal Theoretical Education: A Judge's View of the Gap, 1977
B.Y.U.L. REV. 1061, 1061-62. Yet, when trying to perform any process, whether swinging
a tennis racket, cross-examining a witness, or evaluating a judicial decision, one first must
know the elements constituting the process, their relationship, causal and otherwise, to
each other, and the effect of various stimuli on the process under specified conditions.
Often this knowledge is unsophisticated, and frequently it is preconscious or "tacit," see M.
POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (pt. 2) (rev. ed. 1962) (discussing "tacit" knowledge); F.
HAYECK, supra note 22, at 124-28 (describing the operation of tacit theory in the work of
historians), but it is always theoretical. Without such an understanding, all operations
would be equally attractive and a person would be paralyzed to act. Theoretical knowledge
is thus a prerequisite to the exercise of practical skill and the study of any subject is
neither inherently practical nor inherently theoretical; it is both, and the emphasized
aspect depends on student and teacher choice.
As for the theoretical orientation of substantive law school instruction, there is
reason to believe that this assertion is as much theory as practice. In the first year, for
example, students learn to describe, assess, and generalize about excerpts from judicial
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practice14 and because persuasion and learning mode strategies are
needed in the interactions of law instruction. In teaching about these
subjects, clinical teachers should identify the intellectual differences
between the two modes and should demonstrate each mode in operation.
Equally important, clinical teachers should determine what combina-
tion of the two modes is appropriate for teaching about each of the
modes in particular instructional situations. If this decision is routi-
nized or left to habit, instruction will suffer. Examination of actual
dialogues between clinical teachers and students, in Part II below,
reveals that the clinical teachers failed to distinguish between the
persuasion and learning modes and taught the persuasion mode
pervasively.
6 5
II. EXAMPLES AND ANALYSIS
The following teacher-student exchanges illustrate the ambiguity of
instructional dialogue and the operation of the persuasion mode as a
opinions: mental operations that involve the development of analytical and analogical
"skills." Teachers are more interested in having students perform these processes than in
having them describe or criticize the processes' operation. In this emphasis, the first year
of law school is "clinical" in the "skills-training" sense of that term. Cf. Holmes, Education
for Competent Lawyering - Case Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 535
(1976) (viewing the first year as developing valuable case skills that need to be
supplemented by the development of other lawyering skills in the final two years).
64. How one determines the appropriate combination of the learning and persuasion
modes for any given situation is not addressed systematically in this article. Ultimately,
such a theory of "appropriateness" must be developed.
65. "Taught" means acted almost exclusively in the behaviors of the persuasion mode.
This unconscious practice creates the risk that students will see these behavior patterns as
models and seek to emulate them. See Memo to the Faculty from the Center from
Research on Learning and Teaching, The University of Michigan, No. 43 (Dec. 1970), at
43-44 (copy on file with R. Condlin); id., No. 48 (Apr. 1972), at 52 (copy on file with R.
Condlin). See generally R. GLASER, THE NATURE OF REINFORCEMENT (1971). See also Pipkin,
supra note 41, at 252-53 (describing the reinforcement process in terms of the sociological
concepts of "latent" and "manifest" curriculum).
The risk is two-fold. First, students may conclude that the persuasion mode will
help them to learn (this is only partly true, see text accompanying notes 53 to 60 supra) or,
that it will help them to influence others - that it embodies a sophisticated theory of
persuasion (this also is only partly true). This risk is greater for clinical teachers because
they profess to teach about learning and persuasion (in the ordinary sense). Students may
take them at their word and follow the example of their deeds. In this respect, the process
of practice instruction is also its content (more so than with traditional law instruction).
The second risk is that students might construct their theories of collaborative or
adversarial effectiveness as a reaction to their teachers' persuasion mode behavior -
trying principally to avoid the mode's more disagreeable features. But collaborative
behavior is not the opposite of persuasion mode behavior, see note 28 supra, and




response to that ambiguity. 66 The first dialogue occurred at the
ten-minute mark of the first meeting of a clinical practice course at an
American law school. Immediately prior to the exchange, the teacher
had described the subject matter of the course. He had begun to describe
the course structure when the following conversation occurred:
S:6 7 I wonder if my feeling about learning law is the antithesis of
what this course is about. To me everything we're talking
about now is very intellectual and I do feel that the important
part of learning law to me is to conquer the way I'm feeling
about something. And when we plug in a lot of information
and make a decision and can write all the reasons for the
decision that you still don't have a lot of confidence in what
you're doing. There are two reasons over here, and six over
here, but you're still going to go with the two reasons. And I
think that learning that confidence in the way you feel about
material that you can't articulate, that you can't say where it
came from, your experience that you aren't even consciously
aware of, I guess I feel that's part of learning law too.
66. Though I work with empirical data, this article does not report the findings of
empirical research. I use data from practice instruction to illustrate my hypothesis, not to
prove it. The pool from which this data was selected is "soft" in several ways that indicate
that it might not represent clinical teachers generally. The pool is composed of a small
number of teachers (eleven) and students not randomly selected, who are from an even
smaller number of law schools (seven), which are somewhat geographically concentrated,
and most of which agree intellectually on their approach to clinical instruction. The data
pool basically represents my teaching behaviors and those of a number of my friends now
teaching at other law schools.
In using transcripts as a data base, I purposely accord teacher-student language
an implicit priority over other sources of data about clinical instruction. This is because
instructional language is the most extensive and least manipulable form of data now
available, and also can be a rich source of insight into underlying ideology. See G. KRESS &
R. HODGE, LANGUAGE As IDEOLOGY 4-7, 13,62-82,122-28 (1979).
67. The student is female, in her third year, and has worked in a law firm off and on
for five years. The teacher is male, in his second year of teaching, and espouses a
commitment to behaving in the learning mode, though he did not use that term.
Considerable additional detail could be provided about the political and historical
context in which this and subsequent dialogues in this article occurred. Ultimately, a
complete analysis of these dialogues would include that context. See note 18 supra and
note 68 infra. I focus only on language, however, to isolate verbal communicative
incompetence as a serious problem in its own right and as an aggravating factor of more
fundamental problems. I suspect that many conflicts described as ideological are, in fact,
communication problems or communication aggravated problems. Many of these com-
munication patterns, particularly those that contradict espoused teacher and student
theory, can be changed by combined and sustained acts of the intellect and will.
Ideological adjustment would be not necessary.
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T: I'm trying to figure out how that's different from what I want
you to do. If what you're saying is that learning involves
developing confidence . . .
S: Yeah, in decisions that you can't articulate or can't intellec-
tualize.
T: Learning law involves sort of trusting in one's intuitive
processes? I don't know, is that what you say.
S: I don't like the word intuitive because I think that suggests
some mystical power, but I do think that there's a lot of stuff
that we gain from experience that we can't articulate or
intellectualize.
T: I think that's right.
S: We should learn to act on it. I know in my own life,
everything I've ever done has been intellectual. It's really
taken me a struggle to learn to have confidence in my gut
reaction.
T: Now that's interesting. If you were . . . I would assume that
not only you but there's a healthy suspicion of intellectualiz-
ing in everybody in the room, because people have been
through it for so long and had it drilled into them that
everybody would be suspicious. Then the question is why
wouldn't people be equally suspicious of emotional reactions.
Why would you treat either one differently and why aren't
they a check on one another. If there's discord between your
feeling and where your rational process takes you, why
wouldn't that be a reason to investigate both the basis of your
feeling as well as the logic of your thought? Why wouldn't
thought be a check on strong feeling and strong feeling a
check on thought rather than one dominating the other?
S: I think it would be. I guess I felt that what we'd talked about
to this point was intellectualizing rather than ...
T: It is, it is. But I think I started with the notion that I'd like to
construct a theory. Let me say why. I said earlier that there
are contradictions often between theories of behaving, say,
and what people do. My prediction would be that these
contradictions will continue to exist. If that's not true then
that would be interesting. It'd be important information in
understanding this topic. If it is, these contradictions will
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provide some interesting problems for our study and at this
point constructing a theory of this is an intellectual process.
Although what you're saying is that this theory should make
room for feeling. That seems to me accurate . . . . I don't
know how to put it in . . . [writes "feeling" on blackboard
outline]. Let me just speed it up.
S: (Silence)
For purposes of analysis 68 the dialogue will be reproduced piecemeal,
with a left-hand column added to the transcript.69 This column contains
68. Several perspectives could be used to analyze the effectiveness of the teacher's
behavior. The conversation took place in public, between people with different roles,
status, power, abilities, sexes, knowledge, experience, values, beliefs, objectives, and
needs, as well as in the context of a professional culture and educational setting, both of
which have ideological, economic, racial, sex, and class preferences. Each one of these
factors helped in some way to determine the content of the dialogue. The possibilities for
analysis are almost limitless, and the significance of these factors should not be
minimized. There is a complex interplay among all such aspects of an interaction through
which each aspect is mutually defined. The anthropological concept "thick" is often used to
describe the nature of such interactions and, by extrapolation, the type of analysis that the
interactions would require to be understood fully. See, e.g., Cover, Dispute Resolution: A
Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 912 (1979). (Professor Cover presumably borrowed the phrase
from Clifford Geertz, see C. GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-30 (1973), who, in
turn, borrowed it from Gilbert Ryle. See Walters, Signs of The Times: Clifford Geertz and
Historians, 47 Soc. RES. 537, 542 (1980).) Thick understanding, which is desirable, should
not be confused with "total" understanding which is illusory. See F. HAYECK, supra note
22, at 119-22.
69. This new type of transcript is a product of the work of Argyris and Schon. See C.
ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, supra note 22, at 38-42. It helps to overcome a persistent problem in
clinical scholarship. Notwithstanding the well known distorting effects of memory and
perception, see generally J. MARSHALL, supra Viote 26, at 9-41; E. Lofrus, supra note 56, at
20-87, even the most insightful writing about clinical practice instruction relies heavily
and at critical points on teacher summaries of student action. See, e.g., Lowry & Kennedy,
supra note 63, passim; Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4, at 27, 30, 40. There is no way for
a reader to determine whether he would have summarized the raw data in the same way.
Yet most differences of opinion about instructional effectiveness bog down over what
happened rather than what should be done.
For an earlier use of transcript analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of law
teaching, see Kelso, Teaching Teachers: A Reminiscence of the 1971 AALS Law Teachers
Clinic and a Tribute to Harry W. Jones, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 606 (1972). For a discussion of
the usefulness of transcripts in the study of closely-related lawyering behavior, see Cloyd,
Prosecution's Power, Procedural Rights and Pleading Guilty: The Problem of Coercion in
Plea Bargaining Drug Cases, 26 Soc. PROB. 452, 465 (1979). For thoughtful discussions of
other efforts to develop new methods for collecting data about the processes of instruction,
see C. ARGYRIS & D. SCHON, supra note 22, at 6-11, 30-34; ARGVRIS, supra note 22, at
251-80; W. TORBERT, supra note 32, at 137-201; Mehan, Structuring School Structure, 48
HARV. EDUC. REV. 32, 35-37 (1978); Mishler, supra note 18, at 9-17; P. Johnson, M.
Johnson, & R. Little, Expertise in Oral Advocacy: An Inquiry into Its Nature and
Development 16-32 & n.30-31, 38-39, 42, 45-46 (Aug. 14, 1978) (unpublished paper)
(copy on file with R. Condlin).
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the teacher's and student's recollections of their underlying thoughts




I feel that his class discussion S: I wonder if my feeling about
is emphasizing analytical, intel- learning law is the antithesis
lectual approaches without giv- of what this course is about.
ing value to gut responses. To me everything we're talk-
ing about now is very intel-
lectual and I do feel that the
70. The following procedure was used in filling in the left-hand column. Each
participant was given a verbatim transcript of the dialogue and asked to write what he or
she remembered thinking or feeling at the time of each of her or his statements. Each was
asked to fill in only her or his own thoughts, and the two sets of underlying thoughts thus
produced were combined to complete the transcript. The entire process was completed
within three weeks of the classroom discussion itself. For a description of an almost
identical set of instructions, see ARGYRIS, supra note 22, at 56.
There are several ways in which the content of this left-hand column could be
distorted. The column possibly contains, intermingled with memory, the new thoughts and
feelings triggered by the reading of the transcript itself. In addition, the parties probably
assimilated lessons from the classroom conversation, which, in turn, influenced their
perceptions of their past states of mind. Underlying thoughts and feelings may be more
articulate and coherent as reconstructed, because the instruction to reconstruct causes
more attention to be given to underlying thoughts than did the original conversation.
There is also the risk that the parties determined what appropriate underlying thought
would be and reported them as their own.
These potential distortions notwithstanding, people whuq8ave filled in the
left-hand column report that memories of their feelings come rushing back, immediately,
without noticeable effort on their part. See Nisbett & Wilson, Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCH. REV. 231, 255 (1977) (recent
empirical research finding that people have "little or no direct introspective access to
higher order cognitive processes" but do have direct access to their "focus of... attention
• . . current sensations . . . emotions, evaluations and plans"). See also R. RORTY, supra
note 39, at 70-127 (discussing how and what individuals report when reporting on
internal states). Moreover, "[elach individual's data overwhelmingly challenged his
competence [and] [i]t is difficult to see why people would write distorted cases that make
them appear incompetent." C. ARGYRIS & D. SCH6N, supra note 22, at 66.
If the participants reported present rather than past feelings, this distortion does
not necessarily undercut the usefulness of the method. For teaching purposes, in fact,
present reactions may be more useful. If the dialogue situation is typical, it helps more in
preparing for its recurrence to know how one reacts in the present than how one reacted in
the past.
The exchange reported in the text is brief in comparison with the entire class
from which it was taken, and this may also distort. Two pages may not capture the nuance
of conversational strategies. On the other hand, each person studied was remarkably
uniform in his instructional behavior (even when the behavior was experienced as
different), at least at the level of abstraction of the patterns I discuss. For that reason, two
or three pages of representative dialogue have been enough. For a similar conclusion, see
ARGYRIS, supra note 22, at 251-52.
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important part of learning
law to me is to conquer the
way I'm feeling about some-
thing. And when we plug in
a lot of information and
make a decision and can
write all the reasons for the
decision that you still don't
have a lot of confidence in
what you're doing. There are
two reasons over here, and
six over here, but you're still
going to go with the two
reasons. And I think that
learning that confidence in
the way you feel about mate-
rial that you can't articulate,
that you can't say where it
came from, your experience
that you aren't even con-
sciously aware of, I guess I
feel that's part of learning
law too.
The student began the exchange by stating that "what the
course is about" was "very intellectual" and not "the important part
of learning law." Assume she intended this as a description of what
she thought she heard and saw. Her description may have been
correct, but possibly the teacher's behavior was more ambiguous
than she recognized. The class was the first of the semester, it was
only a few minutes old, and the teacher had not yet completed the
course overview. It is unlikely that the teacher had yet said or done
enough to allow the student or anyone to determine "what the
course [was] about." The student more likely attributed meaning to
a limited amount of teacher behavior based on prior information
about this teacher in particular and expectations about law teachers
and law classes in general. 7 '
71. Another possibility is that the student was projecting her own values and
attitudes onto the professor. See Carrington & Conley, Correspondence - Negative
Attitudes of Law Students: A Replication of the Alienation and Dissatisfaction Factors, 76
Mici. L. REV. 1036, 1040-41 (1978). See also Carrington & Conley, The Alienation of Law
Students, 75 Micii. L. REV. 887 (1977).
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The student also may have evaluated negatively what she heard
the teacher to say. "[M]y feeling about learning is the antithesis of what
this course is about . . . [t]he important part of learning law" is to
conquer feeling, and "learning confidence in the way you feel about
material . . . that's part of learning law too." She apparently believed
that the teacher emphasized intellect over emotion and that this
emphasis was unwise. Until she heard the teacher's reasons for his
choice, rejecting the teacher's emphasis (if it was his. emphasis) may
have been premature.
The student's public action was to own up, an act of courage and
energy in this context. Whether her owning up was accurate is hard to
know because the intensity of her underlying thoughts does not appear
in the left-hand column. On the other hand, some of her language
suggests an attempt to be diplomatic: "I wonder," "I do feel," "I guess I
feel that's part . . . too."7 2 Other parts suggest overstatement: "anti-
thesis"; "course" instead of the word "class" used in the left-hand
column; and "the important part of learning law."
The student could have tested her assessment of the course being
overly intellectual by simply waiting to see if an "emphasis" in the
overview did in fact appear. If she intended to test by speaking up, her
method made it difficult for the teacher to respond - she did not
identify which aspect of the overview she judged overly intellectual and
did not ask whether the teacher planned to add to the overview. She
"tested" only in the sense that she challenged the teacher to defend his
statements against a charge of overintellectualization.
73
I feel defensive, as if what I've T: I'm trying to figure out how
said has been attacked. Besides, I that's different from what I
agree with what she says, so why want you to do. If what
would she attack me. you're saying is that learn-
ing involves developing con-
fidence . . .
S: Yeah, in decisions that you
can't articulate or can't intel-
lectualize.
72. This language could be interpreted as asking a question, though the absence of
questioning in the left-hand column may indicate that the words represent only student
deference to authority. If a question was intended, the length, and repetitive, almost
didactic, structure of the statement, make that question hard to hear.
73. The interpretations presented in the article are meant to be suggestive rather
than exhaustive. To the extent that one sees the exchanges another way, it is further




The teacher responded somewhat in kind. The left-hand column
indicates that he understood no single meaning in the student's first
statement. His reaction was internally contradictory, finding both an
attack and an agreement. These meanings were attributed, however,
because the student's intended meaning was far from clear.74 The
student could have been challenging or agreeing with the teacher's
views, as he hypothesized, but she also could have been asking a
question, expressing frustration, making a request, attempting to
impress, speaking out of habit without conscious intent, or making a
point suppressed in another class. Each of these meanings would call for
a different response. An accurate public reaction (though not necessarily
effective, at least by itself), therefore, probably would have been
confusion, defensiveness, and, perhaps, anger. 75
Evaluation does not appear prominently in the language of the
teacher's first response, although all his statements may suggest that he
attributed anti-intellectualism to the student from the outset and
evaluated it negatively. He may have communicated this belief
nonverbally, but the literal content of his language vacillated between
inquiry and paraphrase. However, he did not inquire directly, did not
own up to his feelings of defensiveness, and did not acknowledge his
contradictory reactions to her statement. While his remarks may look
more learning-oriented than those of the student, on closer examination,
they have many of the same persuasion-oriented qualities.76
Before the teacher finished, the student interrupted,77 perhaps to
agree with what she heard as a statement of position, to answer what
74. Some might say that the teacher owned up, at least privately, to feelings that
were difficult to acknowledge. Not everyone expresses defensiveness so readily, nor reacts
to it with confusion rather than anger, though subsequent events may indicate that this
teacher did not either. But private admission is only part of owning up.
75. As with the student's first statement, the teacher's language could be interpreted
as expressing some of these sentiments. For example, "I'm trying to figure out" could
convey confusion, and the repetition of this theme may indicate defensiveness. Expecting
the student to discover these meanings, however, may have been unrealistic.
On a second point, if the teacher had heard the student's statement as ambiguous,
he might have found this nearly as difficult to express. Saying that one has heard no clear
meaning in another's words is hard, because the other may attribute negative evaluation
to that comment.
76. The difference in outward form between teacher and student communication may
have been due to the teacher's familiarity with the substance of the persuasion-learning
dichotomy and a consequent attempt to use the learning mode. He therefore may have
been torn between an intellectual commitment to behave in the learning mode and the
habit of behaving in the persuasion mode. At this stage of his development and at this
level of stress, he may have been able to capture the appearance of inquiry and perhaps a
part of its spirit, but not its substance.
77. An interruption is often interpreted as a signal to go faster. Picking up the pace of
a conversation, however, increases the pressure on both sides to attribute meaning.
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she heard as a question, or to prevent the teacher from saying what she
did not want to hear. Whatever her intention, the teacher apparently
had not finished, and, to respond, the student had to attribute meaning
to teacher language that was not then clear.
Let me be sure that I've heard
her right.
I feel like he overstated my
position or that I haven't com-
municated what I wanted.
Nobody would disagree with
that.
I feel as if we're in conflict -
he continues to emphasize articu-
lating and intellectualizing when
I feel the need to stress the value
of accepting hunches sometimes
without probing.
T: Learning law involves sort of
trusting in one's intuitive
processes? I don't know, is
that what you say.
S: I don't like the word intui-
tive because I think that sug-
gests some mystical power,
but I do think that there's a
lot of stuff that we gain from
experience that we can't ar-
ticulate or intellectualize.
T: I think that's right.
S: We should learn to act on it.
I know in my own life, every-
thing I've ever done has been
intellectual. It's really taken
me a struggle to learn to
have confidence in my gut
reaction.
The teacher's underlying thoughts indicate that he did not yet
understand the student's position. He publicly summarized her position
as "sort of trusting in one's intuitive processes" and asked her if that is
what she had said. Although the language seems inquiring, the inquiry
may not have been bona fide. The teacher may have decided that he
understood the student's position and found it anti-intellectual. This
judgment becomes more explicit in his next three statements and may
have been near the surface here.
He restates the student's position as trusting in "intuition." Yet
intuition does not have much currency in law school. The teacher's
comment may have suggested subtly that the student had not learned
the first-year lesson that analytical, not intuitive, thought is called for
in classrooms. Because it is unclear that the student extolled intuition,
the teacher may have attributed an incorrect meaning and evaluated
that meaning negatively without a fair test. At a minimum, his
[VOL. 40
SOCRATES' NEW CLOTHES
comments were ambiguous enough to have been heard by the student in
this way.
The student objected to the "intuitive" characterization, perhaps for
the above reason,78 and restated her position. The teacher then said that
the student's statement was "right," although her meaning was unclear.
His underlying thought was phrased differently and possibly indicated
an evaluation of the student's mental process ("she's belaboring the
obvious") rather than simple agreement. The student may have sensed
this lack of congruence between public and private statements because
she continued to give reasons for her position. Her response, however,
was again ambiguous. She could have been lecturing the teacher (that
is, implying that she had matured and the teacher needed to),
attempting to give data to support her general assertions, expanding the
analysis into what she perceived as the second level, trying to reduce
tension by owning up to an embarrassing self-admission, or making a
statement to herself about self-growth. Whatever she intended, the
teacher seemed to have heard something that was now clear, for at this
point his statements seemed to lose any mixed quality of learning and
persuasion and became entirely persuasion oriented.
I agree that is important. But
it's also important to think about
gut reactions. Nobody's gut is
inherently trustworthy. And she
may be minimizing the import-
ance of thinking.
T: Now that's interesting. If
you were . . . I would
assume that not only you but
there's a healthy suspicion of
intellectualizing in every-
body in the room, because
people have been through it
for so long and had it drilled
into them that everybody
would be suspicious. Then
the question is why wouldn't
people be equally suspicious
of emotional reactions. Why
would you treat either one
differently and why aren't
they a check on one another.
If there's discord between
your feeling and where your
rational process takes you,
78. Because intuiting is sometimes stereotyped as a female mode of thought, the
teacher's use of the word may have seemed sexist, adding to the student's negative
reaction to the word.
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That's a response I can't quar-
rel with but I still feel that the
emphasis of the class discussion
to this point has been on dissect-
ing, without positively asserting
the value of simply responding as
a whole person.
She's probably right. I haven't
said much about feelings. I
almost never do until I'm re-
minded. But there are a number
of other parts of this framework I
want to get out. I'm going to have
to move along.
why wouldn't that be a
reason to investigate both
the basis of your feeling as
well as the logic of your
thought? Why wouldn't
thought be a check on strong
feeling and strong feeling a
check on thought rather
than one dominating the
other?
S: I think it would be. I guess I
felt that what we'd talked
about to this point was intel-
lectualizing rather than...
T: It is, it is. But I think I
started with the notion that
I'd like to construct a theory.
Let me say why. I said ear-
lier that there are contradic-
tions often between theories
of behaving, say, and what
people do. My prediction
would be that these contra-
dictions will continue to ex-
ist. If that's not true then
that would be interesting.
It'd be important informa-
tion in understanding this
topic. If it is, these contradic-
tions will provide some in-
teresting problems for our
study and at this point con-
structing a theory of this is
an intellectual process.
Although what you're saying
is that this theory should
make room for feeling. That
seems to me accurate. . . . I
don't know how to put in
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. . . [writes "feeling" on
blackboard outline]. Let me
speed it up.
I feel that the discussion some- S: (Silence)
how has been shut off, that the
subject has been pigeonholed.
In this sequence, the teacher made his most explicit attribution of
anti-intellectualism, evaluated that attitude negatively, and diplomati-
cally - thus ambiguously - communicated his point. His language is
noteworthy. Rather than explicitly stating his feelings, he described the
student's position as one others had taken, perhaps to lessen the
appearance of personal attack. The student, however, could have taken
this statement to mean that her views were commonplace. He explained
her belief as conditioned rather than chosen, perhaps to absolve her
from responsibility; but the student could have thought he meant her
level of self-awareness was low and her ability to choose limited. He
objected to her perceived anti-intellectualism not in declarative sent-
ences but in rhetorical questions, perhaps to avoid indicting her
directly as an individual; but the student could have interpreted this
statement as an attempt to protect her from difficult information that
(the teacher believed) she could not put in perspective by herself.
The teacher's last two statements are marked by their length,
single-mindedness, density, emphasis, and rhetorical quality. The
statements may have signaled to the student that the teacher wanted
the discussion ended. She qualified her last public comment and seemed
to back away from the issue. The teacher's response may have played
out this backing-away ritual. He agreed with the student's charge that
the discussion had been intellectualized - his first such acknowledge-
ment - but buried this acknowledgment under a long justification and
a pro forma gesture to assimilate her contribution. He did not say that
she had reminded him that he often deemphasized feeling nor did he
communicate that his true reason for wanting to cut off discussion was
to move along. Either factor would have given the student more data to
consider in making her final judgments. 9
When asked to reconstruct the left-hand column, both teacher and
student remembered vividly only the feelings of discomfort experienced
79. As a reason for ending dialogue, "moving along" is often as acceptable to students
as it is to teachers. For one thing, it says that a conversation has not finished and may be
revived at a later time and place. Even if offensive, it is often no more so than a
long-winded argument that serves as its proxy.
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during the dialogue. Before reading the transcript, neither could recall
the topic of the exchange, the resolution, or the specific statements.
Each, however, was clear that the experience had been unpleasant and
that he and she were not likely to repeat it. Their reasons for discomfort
had many of the same qualities as their thought patterns in the
dialogue. Each worried that the other (as well as the remainder of the
class) would think negatively of her or him, and each attributed this
judgment to the other. Each person was angry at the other for making
the attributed judgment because, in the view of each, the judgment was
unjustified. At no point did either person recall being confused about
what the other had said or curious about the tone of the exchange.80
In the next illustration a teacher and student are reviewing three
interviews that the student has conducted with separate clients (C1, C2,
and C3). The excerpt reproduced below occurred in the first few minutes
of the meeting after an agenda had been agreed upon and after a brief




I'm suspicious of people want-
ing clients to like them and a
little troubled that S has made it
such an important element of his
definition of a good attorney-
client relationship. At least he
makes being competent an equal-
ly important aspect of a good
relationship. I wonder how he
uses that criterion to evaluate
his own behavior.
DIALOGUE
T: [Student has just finished
stating that it was important
to him that a client like him
as a person and as a lawyer.]
How did you feel about the
three interviews? I mean did
you get the feeling that those
three clients did like you or
that the relationship was be-
ginning to develop?
S: I thought that in C1 like I
said, because a lot had to do
80. The irony is that both teacher and student argued over a point on which they
essentially agreed and in a manner that affected their ability to understand one another
and their willingness to work together in the future. Irony notwithstanding, "cognitive
conflict", one in which the actual interests of the parties coincide even though they
perceive their interests as antagonistic, see Thibaut & Walker, supra note 10, at 543 (and
sources cited therein), is commonplace in the teacher-student dialogues I have recorded.
Many seeming cognitive conflicts are in fact ideological, see note 66 supra, and thus more
difficult to resolve.




I wasn't that enamored of C1
because he kept pressing us to
get the interview over. His girl
friend was outside and occa-
sionally she'd come to the win-
dow to check on when it would
end. I think S was as important
to the interview going well as C1.
I agree that it went well though
and maybe part of it is that S
and C1 are a lot alike.
I don't think C 2 and C3 inter-
views went all that well. In C3's
case a lot of what we prepared for
was irrelevant so S can't really
be faulted. In C2 's case, however,
it was a simple case where the
preparation was not difficult. I
don't want to reinforce his feeling
that C2's interview went well.
This is an example of how good
feelings about an interview are
not a substitute for doing a good
with C1. I think that he's
that kind of person.
T: You share a lot of experi-
ences, you're about the same
age, and may have some
similar attitudes about life
generally.
S: Yeah, right. C2 also, I think
that I got along pretty well
with C 2, she was fairly in-
telligent and well, I don't
know, I just felt good after
that interview, felt that, and
just the phone calls and, you
know, the whole thing about
getting her scheduled,
whereas C3 was the toughest.
Maybe it was because there
was a big difference between
C3 in kind of life style you
know, being on parole and
being on welfare. I mean
there is more of a distance
between C3 and me, natural-
ly. So it was tougher there
and also, C1 was in the office
so many times he was used
to it but C3 seemed nervous
in the office.
T: That's interesting. I think
that I, I mean that I agree
with your impressions for
the C1 interview that, at
least on that aspect of it. I
think that the two of you did
hit it off pretty well and I
think that it was a combina-
tion of the fact that he had
seen a lot of law students
and lawyers and he was pret-
ty socialized to the process
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job. I thought that he cut her off,
discouraged her from talking
with his constant note taking
and didn't seem relaxed at all.
The C1 interview, on the other
hand, wasn't that bad. S knew
that case a lot better and as a
result, knew what to ask. I'll
reinforce that but only the aspect
of preparation. It's more impor-
tant that he prepare than that he
feel good about clients relating to
him.
and you went more than half
way to make it a good inter-
view, and on that level, I
mean I think there were
some informational level
problems in the interview,
but in relating to his person-
ality, I agree with you there.
I think that it went pretty
well. It was an interview in
which the case had gone
along the furthest and you
knew the most about the
case of any of the ones you'd
worked on. In some ways you
knew specifically what you
wanted in the way of
answers and one of my im-
pressions was that that re-
laxed you. That one of the
reasons you were relaxed
and you were able to concen-
trate on conducting a good
interview, hitting it off with
him, was because you knew
the case very well.
Yes.
Yeah, and you knew the law
and you didn't have to write
out his whole answer when
he gave you one because a
few key words were enough
for you to remember. So my
impression was, you know,
that it did go well. I guess I
didn't see you and him as
having as much in common
as you did. But in any event,
he did seem, I mean he
seemed less communicative
than you would ordinarily
be. He was friendly but it
[VOL. 40
SOCRATES' NEW CLOTHES
was kind of that he smiled a
lot and everything, but he
never really said very much
or he never really gave ex-
tended answers or he never
really looked like he was
there to make another friend
because he'd been through
that.
S: Oh, yeah, well right.
T: But I got the feeling that you
were more relaxed in that
interview than others and
my interpretation of that
was just that, it was how
much you knew. I mean you
felt good about that case.
You'd been through it. You
could handle it.
In this exchange, the teacher apparently tried to coerce the student
into agreeing with the teacher's private, untested, and, perhaps,
spontaneous8 2 analysis of the student's performance. The teacher
distrusted client affection as a criterion of interviewing success. He
wanted the student instead to focus on knowing legal theories and on
questioning about evidence that would support these theories.8 3 He
could have said that directly and discussed the reasons for his emphasis,
but he kept his view and reasons private.
If he did not want to reveal his criteria for effective interviewing he
had other options. He could have asked the student to describe what it
meant to have someone "like him as a person and as a lawyer," why this
was part of good interviewing, what in the interview led the student to
conclude that the client had liked him, and what methods he had used
to verify this reading of the client's feelings.
82. For example, the belief that the student and client were "a lot alike," and that
this factor played a role in the success of the interview, may have occurred to the teacher
for the first time as he spoke. The idea does not appear until the end of his second
underlying thought (significant if his reconstruction was intended as sequential), is
qualified with a "maybe," and is expressed in language different from "a lot alike."
83. In a later discussion the teacher defined "competent" (see the first paragraph of
the teacher's left-hand column) as spotting legal theories in stories told by clients and
being able to question for evidence to support these theories.
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Possibly the student also thought that questioning was the most
important part of the interview but believed that the clients had liked
him because he questioned well. The student alternatively might have
believed that the relationship issues were as important as the informa-
tion issues on which the teacher had focused, 4 and, in effect, might
have been suggesting a different agenda from the teacher's;8 5 or he
simply might have been noting a feeling (common to many first-time
interviewers) that it is nice to be appreciated, a point with which the
teacher could easily agree. In other words, the student might have been
saying the same thing as the teacher but in a different way, or
suggesting interpretations that added to and complemented those of the
teacher. The teacher's unwillingness or inability to make his thoughts
public may have caused the teacher to miss these possibilities and
perhaps to choose an emphasis that was unnecessary or confusing.
The teacher was nearly as secretive in his thoughts about other
issues. He stated that C, and the student liked one another because
they were alike, but he did not state the reasons for this belief. He also
did not express the full extent of his negative feelings about C1 or his
disagreement with the student's more positive reaction to that client.
8 6
Perhaps the teacher left these issues unexamined because he had
determined that the principal topic of the meeting was to be the value of
preparation and knowledge, the central themes of the last half of the
exchange.
Unfortunately, the last half of the "dialogue" was a soliloquy. The
teacher controlled air time with repetitive statements about the value of
preparation to good interviews. He did not test his assertion that the
student performed well because he was well prepared, nor did he
describe what led him to that conclusion. The student did not stop these
soliloquies and ask for evidence perhaps because he lacked the stature,
84. There is considerable scholarship suggesting that relationship issues are
important in interviewing. See, e.g., A. BENJAMIN, supra note 31, at 33-56; D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 6-19 (1977); R. KAHN & C. CANNELL, THE
DYNAMICS OF INTERVIEWING 22-64 (1957); A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING PROCESS 6-11 (1976).
85. There is some evidence to support this different order of importance. During the
course of his interview, the client revealed the names of two new witnesses to the incident
in question. He had kept these names secret, he explained, because the witnesses were
friends and he did not want to get them involved. It may have been his trust for the
student that convinced the client to reveal the names. In starting with client feelings, the
student may have been suggesting this nexus.
86. For example, late in the exchange the teacher expressed his negative reaction to
C, indirectly, briefly, and diplomatically. Yet, when the student responded equivocally,
possibly to suggest disagreement or doubt, the teacher dropped the subject immediately.
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formal authority, and perspective to question the teacher's interpreta-
tions or perhaps because the teacher was complimenting the student.
Moreover, the student may have determined, reasonably, that the
teacher did not want to be interrupted and that the student should only
pay attention and take mental notes. The teacher's point about
preparation is a good one in the abstract and worthy of emphasis at
some appropriate moment, but an instructional comment requires more
than abstract goodness to be timely.
In the soliloquies, the teacher also repeatedly interjected disagree-
ment with the student's analysis without allowing these competing
diagnoses to be tested. He hinted that he might not agree that the C 2
and C3 interviews went well and mentioned some "informational level
problems" in the interview of C3 , yet he neither gave examples nor
elaborated on either point. Moreover, he made these references at the
beginning of a long statement about preparation, where they would be
difficult for the student to recognize and remember. Had the teacher
wanted to explore these issues in detail, he could have raised them
separately, given examples, and invited a response.
In the next example a teacher and student are editing an appellate
brief that the student had written. This excerpt comes from the
forty-minute mark of a meeting that lasted for one hour. The teacher
began the exchange by asking a question about particular language
that the student had used in his draft of an argument.
UNDERLYING THOUGHTS
AND FEELINGS
"Hopelessly entangled" is a
type of caricatured writing that
you see in a lot of briefs written
by people who figure that being
adversarial means overstating or
being belligerent. It stands out in
this first paragraph because most
of the rest of it is quite good. To
leave in an expression such as
that would drag the rest of the
argument down. I don't want to
say that though because it will
look like I'm handing down a
pronouncement. I would like C2
to come to that conclusion for
himself. I'm not sure why he used
DIALOGUE
T: The beginning, the introduc-
tion, is there some other
reason that would support a
request for an interpretation
of Chapter 22 section 9A
other than the case had been
"hopelessly entangled" in a
complicated web of statutory
construction.
S: Well, another reason, I
guess, would be that we
want to set a precedent here
so that future proceedings
under 22 § 9A, if there are
any after this mess, it'll be a
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this language. I think its because
he thinks that it's persuasive. It's
also consistent with some of the
way he relates to me in person.
He sometimes is dogmatic and
perhaps a little arrogant. I don't
like those traits particularly and
will do what I can to reinforce
them negatively.
I wonder whether he's even
seen that there's a problem with
this language. Maybe if I show
him how it could be argued
against us, or at least an internal
inconsistency in his argument,
he'll get the point.
It doesn't sound as good as I
thought it would. I'd better drop
the whole point and get on to
something more important. It
also doesn't look as if it's making
any impact on S. He doesn't seem
to think that my argument of
inconsistency is that strong. I'll
get the language out of the brief
later, but now I'd better move on.
little bit clearer what the
exact standard the trial
board and municipal court
should follow.
T: Does that strike you, saying
that the case is hopelessly
entangled, strike you as
being a two-edged sword?
S: In that we may have contri-
buted to the entanglement?
T: Not so much that, but if it is
in fact hopelessly entangled,
well, I guess just in saying
that it's hopeless, is it more
than you want to say? Be-
cause in a sense you're going
to argue that it's not. That
the single justice did under-
stand what he was doing and
that the result he reached
was correct.8 7 And so, in a
sense that may be overstat-
ing your position a little bit.
But in any event, let me do
this with stuff like this. I
will make an effort at rewrit-
ing and then we can go over
it, and you can do the same
thing.
87. The student's client had prevailed at trial, in part, because the trial judge - "the
single justice" - had construed the language of the statute in the client's favor.
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The teacher appears to have tried diplomatically to communicate a
strongly worded and incompletely thought-out"8 evaluation of the
student and his work. In the process, the teacher expressed something
different from his thinking. Although he thought the student's writing
was "caricatured," he merely asked the student two ambiguous
questions. He also withheld his judgment that the student was
'.sometimes dogmatic and perhaps a little arrogant," although the
judgment may have influenced his choice of language and action. The
teacher then wondered privately "whether he's even seen that there's a
problem with this language." The question is appropriate but was never
asked out loud. The teacher then dropped the subject because "it doesn't
look as if it's making any impact." His evaluation was probably correct,
but for reasons different from those the teacher suspected.
The teacher may have withheld his judgment of "caricature" for
fear that it would lead into an emotionally uncomfortable discussion of
the student's alleged arrogance. If so, this created a new dilemma. The
teacher could avoid discussing dogmatism and arrogance only by
avoiding negative statements, yet he could not teach unless he disclosed
his evaluative reactions, some of which would be negative.
In refusing to test his judgment of "caricature" because of possible
unpleasantness, the teacher may not have recognized the impact of his
choice on the effectiveness of his instruction. "Arrogant" and "dogmatic"
are unusually strong words and seem disproportionate to the error that
the student allegedly committed.8 9 If these words were dispro-
portionately strong, the teacher's reaction, itself, may have been a
caricature, which is, ironically, the same failing that he found in the
student. Yet the teacher's failure to test his analysis may have
prevented him from discovering his own caricature. 90 Moreover, his
88. The teacher seems confused about how to raise his reaction, says that his
questions do not sound as good as he thought they would, and does not specify the
connection, even privately, between his judgment of arrogance and dogmatism and the
student's work product.
89. The teacher possibly referred to prior experiences as his data base for the
judgment that the student is arrogant and dogmatic. Yet if these experiences are triggered
by the present work product, presumably something about that work product also strikes
the teacher as dogmatic and arrogant. The teacher says as much when he describes the
student's writing as "consistent with some of the ways he relates to me in person . ..
sometimes . . .dogmatic and perhaps a little arrogant."
90. If this was true, it produced an interesting bind for the student. The teacher was
criticizing the student for using caricature yet implicitly approving of caricature by using
it to communicate his own (the teacher's) criticism. No doubt the student did not
understand this explicitly, but if he picked up these contradictory signals at some sensory
level, deciding what to believe would have been difficult indeed. The teacher's ability to
recognize caricature in the student, but not in himself, may be an example of
disassociative behavior. See note 46 supra.
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unilateral9 1 and private strategy of rewriting the argument himself,
might have been an outgrowth of this caricatured feeling. If so, strong
feelings that he could not discuss may have influenced the instructional
course that he took and confused rather than clarified an issue.
When a colleague later suggested that he should have communi-
cated his judgment accurately, the teacher responded that it would have
been too threatening to the student. 92 For several reasons, his
conclusion is suspect. This student did not enjoy negative evaluations
but he also did not like being misled, "protected" from difficult
experiences, talked to in code, or screened from information about his
impact on others. Given an awareness of these trade-offs, the student
might have chosen the short-term discomfort of negative feedback over
the long-range consequences of its alternatives. 93
Also, articulating and discussing the judgment of arrogance94 might
have involved less risk than the teacher thought. Some of the discomfort
resulting from negative evaluation comes from the manner in which it
is expressed. A general statement that this student was arrogant,
91. The unilateral properties of the teacher's behavior appear most prominently in
his reaction to the student's efforts to participate in the analysis and redrafting. When the
teacher suggested that the argument could be better, the student attempted to discuss the
subject. The teacher rebuffed these efforts and ended the discussion by telling the student
that he (the teacher) would rewrite the argument.
92. Another possibility is that saying what he thought would have been too
threatening to the teacher. Assigning responsibility for events solely to people outside
one's self is often an example of disassociative behavior. See note 45 supra.
93. The difficulty is that this commonplace choice is seldom apparent to students. In
addition to this choice being hard to identify as the issue, the long-term consequences of
lost opportunity, ineffective habit, and retarded ambition are hard to predict for people
who are young. This means that teachers frequently must make the decision to discuss or
to avoid negative evaluations. To be able to do this, teachers must have a perspective that
goes beyond the immediate and an emotional ability to delay gratification; they must
make their instructional decisions for positive reasons and not simply react to the most
immediate student feeling. The teacher's best course in this exchange may have been to
act on his own judgment rather than on the fear of negative student reaction.
94. This is not to suggest that the teacher should have said to the student, "I find
your behavior arrogant and dogmatic." Among other reasons for withholding this
information is that the teacher's beliefs may have been more complicated. For example,
the teacher also believed that it was inadvisable to "hand down a pronouncement."
Perhaps this was because he feared pronouncing would inhibit student learning, or
perhaps because he was uncertain of any idea about which he would feel tempted to
pronounce. Whatever his additional feelings and beliefs, they may have qualified his
evaluation in ways he would want to know about before discussing it with the student. If
so, it made sense to hold back and to, "first, do no harm." But suspending judgment is not
the same as taking a judgment into account privately, and the teacher may have done the
latter instead. He mentions that he "will do what [he] can to reinforce [arrogance and
dogmatism] negatively," and tries to do so through the proxy topic of "caricatured




without evidence or examples, would have been difficult to hear because
it would have been difficult to test. When the student knew what
behavior the teacher interpreted as arrogant, he could determine for
himself and discuss with the teacher whether the behavior occurred,
whether the teacher's is the only or best interpretation, and whether it
is the meaning that he, the student, intended. Put another way, the
judgment of arrogance, when substantiated with data, could have been
tested more thoroughly for accuracy, and if accurate, used as a guide for
behaving in a less arrogant manner in the future.95 The unsubstanti-
ated assertion of arrogance, communicated indirectly, offered neither of
these options.96
Even if the student could not hear and the teacher could not express
negative evaluation comfortably, the teacher should not necessarily
hold back his negative evaluation. Learning, to paraphase Francis
Allen, is "a contact sport" in which emotional comfort is a necessary but
not sufficient condition. 97 Neither the teacher nor the student benefits
from failing, however slightly, to evaluate honestly.
A final feature of the transcript warrants brief discussion. The
teacher devised and began to execute a strategy for convincing the
student that the student's language was ill-advised. Once begun, the
teacher determined that his argument did not "sound as good as [he]
thought it would." He dropped it because, he later admitted, he did not
95. For an illustration of presenting negative comment as hypothesis and testing for
accuracy, see ARGYRIS, supra note 22, at 84-94.
96. Negative evaluation also is easier to hear from someone who understands that
such evaluation can be uncomfortable, does not intend the discomfort, and has overcome a
discomfort of his own in communicating such thoughts. While these feelings of discomfort
are present in most people who share evaluative thoughts regularly, often that fact is not
apparent to a listener. For this reason, one sometimes should express one's honest
discomfort in giving negative evaluation (even though this, too, can be uncomfortable),
encourage a listener's critical reaction to the evaluation, and leave the subject when one's
thoughts have been communicated and understood. It is not necessary that the listener
agree before the discussion moves on. Unfortunately, the teacher did none of these things
in this case.
97. Letter to Robert J. Condlin from Francis Allen at 3 (Sept. 22, 1977) (copy on file
with R. Condlin). See also Allen, The New Anti-Intellectualism in American Legal
Education, LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES, No. 3, 1977, at 6.
Emotional comfort here means the absence of disabling anxiety. To learn,
students must struggle with challenging problems within their grasp under conditions of
"psychological success." See C. ARGYRIS, supra note 1, at 39, 44; W. TORBERT, supra note
32, at 16-17. To be challenging, problems must have solutions that are not self-evident,
and to be within a student's grasp, the solutions must be discoverable with struggle. The
absence of self-evident solutions and the need for struggle will and should produce
anxiety. But teachers can and should keep such anxiety at a level that is energizing, not
paralyzing. See also Gaylin, Vegetalotry, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 18, 1979 (discussing
the role of emotional comfort in learning).
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want to "look bad" in front of the student." The teacher did not want to
argue for a position that would eventually lose. The teacher saw the
evaluation of work product with the student as a competitive process in
which success as a teacher depended upon winning exchanges about
interpretation. The prospect of putting forward a view that did not hold
up under scrutiny threatened his self-image.
The final illustration is taken from the forty-five-minute mark in
an hour and one-half meeting near the end of the semester to discuss
issues of the student's choosing. The teacher and student had worked
well together in the semester and each had reported separately that he
trusted and respected the other.
UNDERLYING THOUGHTS
AND FEELINGS DIALOGUE
S: One thing, I have fear, the
idea that I'm being taken
possibly by these clients, by
some of them anyway. With
C4 I would naturally believe
anything he told me because
he seemed, he said, "I was
going to forget about the
whole thing until Ruthie
made me, she forced it on me
so I decided, O.K., I'll do it."
Since he doesn't have such a
vested interest in getting the
money back; whereas C5, I
mean I was just thinking to
myself, suppose he picked up
a big rock and threw it
through his front window be-
cause he was mad. How
would I know. I mean, I
know I tend to believe people
too much and it bothers me
that some people can some-
how be able to tolerate it
when somebody puts some-
98. Another view is that it would "look bad" to refuse to explore an intellectual issue
before one could argue convincingly for a single position.
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I don't know how to tell for
sure whether clients are lying or
not. If I began to think about
that it would probably screw up
everything. Besides, does it make
a lot of difference that C5 might
be lying. He's in the worst possi-
ble position to pay for the win-
dow and the landlord is in the
best. So what does it matter that
C 5 may have broken his own
window. The lying client is more
of a concern for corporate or
criminal lawyers, not for lawyers
for legal services.
thing over on them. Then I
believed everything C5 told
me. If the landlord came in
and told me his story I'd
probably believe everything
he told me.
T: How does that relate to your
notion of what, as a lawyer,
you should be doing? In
other words, given the fact
that you're performing now
as a lawyer, how do those
feelings fit in with your no-
tion of what your obligation
is to someone who comes in?
If you're worried about that
person lying to you, what are
your criteria for deciding
what you should do? Given
the fact that you're . . .
S: Well, I think I have some
sense of, you know, which
side of the given issue I'd
want to be on for myself. I
mean if the landlord came in,
I don't think I could properly
handle this case at all.
The student began by describing recurrent feelings in the repre-
sentation of two clients. He was fearful and intolerant of deception, and
yet also believed that he was unable to recognize it. The student
admitted to feelings of ignorance, gullibility, and dependence, which
embarrassed him and made him uncomfortable. The trust and respect
the student had for the teacher made possible these difficult admissions.
The teacher, ironically, had similar feelings about deception but did not
share them. He also did not share the "political analysis" (the landlord
has more money) that he (and eventually the student) used to justify his
refusal to consider the issue.
The teacher responded to the student's act of risk-taking by
changing and intellectualizing the subject. The question of "how do I
know when a client is lying?" became 'what does lawyer role obligation
require me to do for a client I suspect to be lying?" The second, more
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personal question of "how do I live with the fact that I have been lied
to?" was dropped out of the discussion altogether. A lawyer's profession-
al obligations regarding lying is an important issue, one that the
teacher and student should have considered at some point; but the
personal question of dealing with strong feelings of distrust arising
spontaneously in a relationship with another was intertwined and more
timely.
By changing the question to one of lawyer role obligation, the
teacher may have seemed to suggest that lawyers should not think
about topics of personal feeling. "Lawyer role obligation" could be a
code, as it often is in practice, for the suggestion that lawyers should not
dawdle over such emotional, personal, subjective questions to which
there are no answers.9 9 The teacher's use of the expression may indicate
to the student that, except where the problem is so severe as to
jeopardize trial credibility, a lawyer should not worry about the
truth-telling propensities of a client or a witness.
Possibly because the teacher was embarrassed by his own asser-
tions or was uncomfortable with a topic that involved personal feelings,
he asked his question in a number of ways and did not stop talking until
interrupted. His statement may have been nervous talk, intended to fill
time until the anxiety aroused by the topic went away or was controlled.
The teacher may have intellectualized both his own and the student's
emotional response to a moral dilemma in the student's work. In the
process he may have suggested subliminally that there are no
satisfactory answers to such dilemmas, only simplistic rationalizations
which excuse the failure to struggle with such issues.'0 0
99. Not dawdling over emotion is one of the teachings of the "rationality"
characteristic of the persuasion mode. See text accompanying notes 39 and 49 to 52 supra.
100. An instructional method that ignores the substance of emotional response risks
setting a student up for such future beliefs. The harm in this, as William Simon has
pointed out, is that it tends to alienate the individual from his own ends. See Simon, supra
note 22, at 114. Suppressing discussion of private moral and political beliefs is
commonplace in practice instruction. See note 112 infra. The problem is also present in
new associate training in law firms where economic self-interest is added to the ego
constraints that operate in law school practice teaching. It is the essence of university
teaching to draw out such private views, in major part, to add to the development of a
critical ideal against which to measure lawyer work choices, not only for instrumental
effectiveness but also for moral and political legitimacy. The moral and political critique of
lawyering is not valued so highly in law firm training where time must be billed. This
difference in interests is the principal response to the often asked question of why law
schools, rather than law firms, should "train" students in "practical skills." See C.




In all of the foregoing examples'' the teachers' behavior was
replete with private diagnoses of what the students should learn, and
unilaterally chosen strategies for having the students acquire that
learning. 10 2 These teachers often were coercive in their gratuitous
repetition of pre-selected themes and self-protective in their reluctance
to discuss those themes other than diplomatically and indirectly. Little
data were given to support conclusions and little open-ended, candid
testing of analysis was encouraged. Strong feeling, when present, was
sidestepped, transmogrified, or suppressed. While the histrionics and
exaggeration of courtroom discourse rarely were present, the substance
of the discussions tracked the persuasion mode.'0 3 In a subtle and thus
hard to confront manner, the teachers in these excerpts dominated and
manipulated their students and taught their students how to do the
101. Some have criticized the content of these excerpts as trivial or mundane. It is true
that only the last excerpt contains a discussion of explicit political or moral questions. But
each excerpt involves issues of how power and responsibility are divided, whether decision
processes will be democratic or authoritarian, whether domination and manipulation will
be permitted, and whether persons will be treated as ends not as means. Moreover the
commonplace nature of the content of these dialogues is part of their point. Because they
occur routinely, such dialogues have a greater potential for developing and reinforcing
habits. See note 65 supra. Ultimately, these habits, through a kind of adverse possession,
may mature into values that determine ideologies. This is the familiar notion of "you
become what you do." See, e.g., R. COLES, EIK H. ERIKSON: THE GROWTH OF His WORK 339
(1970).
102. Having described the behavior in the foregoing excerpts as persuasion mode, I do
not give examples of contrasting learning mode behavior. This makes it difficult for the
reader to determine if the learning mode construct refers to a known or realizable reality.
I acknowledge this as a shortcoming of the present article. I have not provided such
examples, partly because I do not know all of the participants in these excerpts well
enough to speculate on this point. If I knew them I would still be hesitant, consistent with
my theory, to provide such examples unilaterally. Equally important, the task of
illustrating the learning mode is too substantial for inclusion within this already long
article. Argyris has given examples of learning mode behavior in another context. See C.
ARGYRIS, BEHIND THE FRONT PAGE 110-37 (1974).
In addition, I have discussed the persuasion and learning modes throughout as a
set of behavioral practices, disembodied from an underlying ideology. In part, the modes
are just that - unselfconscious habits which can be controlled through acts of the intellect
and will. On the other hand, the pervasiveness of the persuasion mode, the way in which it
circumscribes the universe of discourse, and the instrumental advantage it provides to law
teachers (or lawyers in practice settings), suggests the presence of an underlying ideology
of "persuasiveness."
103. These transcripts demonstrate the risks in emphasizing "experiencing" over
"interpreting" in clinical practice instruction. See note 2 supra. Experience can develop
bad habits as well as good ones, even when "supervised." If the teachers and students in
the foregoing excerpts did not understand the communication patterns in their conversa-
tions with each other it would have been better for these teachers and students to have




same to others. 10 4 The irony is that these teachers were interested in
establishing bilateral relationships with their students in which
understanding was publicly and collaboratively pursued. They were
surprised to discover the patterns that emerged as their behavior was
examined. They were unaware of the contradictions between their
intended and actual methodologies and unaware that they were
unaware.'0 5 Unfortunately, these excerpts are representative of the
clinical practice instruction I have studied.
10 6
III. IMPLICATIONS, CAUSES, AND CONCERNS
If the foregoing communication patterns are widespread in clinical
practice instruction there are obvious possible consequences for student
learning'0 7 and law practice, 10 8  but there is also a special lost
opportunity dimension to their use. Law school instruction, in its
totality, seeks to develop certain habits of mind. One commentator
describes these habits as: "a skeptical attitude toward generalizations;
an instrumental approach to law and lawyering; a 'tough-minded' and
104. The students also acted in the persuasion mode. But the teachers' greater skill,
stature, and formal power enabled them to impose their views. What outcomes an
evenly-balanced persuasion-mode contest would have produced is difficult to determine.
105. For a description of this discrete state, see Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 70, at
255-57; C. ARYRIS & D. SCH6N, supra note 22, at 112-13.
106. The excerpts were selected, initially, not for their qualities of persuasion or
learning, but because they occurred near the beginning, middle, or end of an instructional
session. When their similarities were discovered, the rest of the recordings from which
they were taken were screened for behavior that was different; all of the behavior was
substantially the same. This conclusion has implications for the current debate about
lawyer competence and morality. See Cramton, Rising Expectations in Law Practice and
Legal Education, 7 N. Ky. L. REV. 159 (1980) (and sources cited therein); cf. note 128 infra.
Many of the participants in this debate do not seem to recognize the ambiguous nature of
the lawyer behavior that they evaluate. See, e.g., J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1977);
A. STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL (1977). These writers do not discuss the possibility that they
could be attributing meanings to this behavior that their lawyer subjects did not intend or
that other observers would not agree with. In this respect, these analyses are not
philosophically "critical." See note 53 supra. These writers seem to assume that lawyers
agree that their (the lawyers') actions are asocial or amoral, but persist in them anyway,
usually (it is charged) for th money. The possibility that lawyer "amorality" could be
misinterpreted persuasion mode behavior, used unselfconsciously and innocently out of
habit, in situations where it did nyt belqng, is not considered. In discussing lawyer
amorality, however, it is necessary to differentiate between people who are evil, on the one
hand, and people who are ignorant, lazy, and immature, on the other. By assuming the
worst case (conscious malingering) in most instances, much current scholarship is often
offensive as well as beside the point. This is known intuitively by many to whom the
proposals for reform in such scholarship are addressed, and may often be the reason for the
rejections of these proposals. Put another way, many writers use the persuasion mode to
condemn the persuasion mode, and do not discuss the contradiction implicit in this action.
107. See text accompanying notes 53 to 55 and 104 supra.
108. See note 112 infra.
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analytical attitude toward legal tasks and professional roles; and a faith
that man, by the application of his reason and the use of democratic
processes, can make the world a better place."'10 9 All of law school joins
in this process - it is one theme that ties all law instruction together.
The process is pursued more explicitly in the first than in subsequent
years, but it occurs constantly.
In most law courses it is difficult for teachers to give individualized
instruction in habits of mind. Classes are too large to have separate and
continuous dialogues with each student, and the obligation of passing on
information distracts attention from this task. In three years, most
students will have few conversational opportunities to think deeply
about a subject with their teachers. For most, the development of these
intellectual habits will be a vicarious and private process.
Clinical practice instruction, with one-to-one relationships as its
norm, provides a unique opportunity to do individualized instruction in
habits of mind. Moreover, this instruction can be done continuously over
time so that these habits can be understood fully and take hold. For
some students this instruction would be advanced and for others
remedial, but for each it would build upon and reinforce the equivalent
instruction in other law school classes. In this way, clinical instruction
would be one developmental stage in the student's acquisition of the
intellectual habits of law. It is a central challenge of clinical instruction
to perform this task. For clinical teachers to pass up this opportunity or
worse, to use it only to reinforce the habits and values of domination
and manipulation, is particularly sad. 110
109. Cramton, supra note 50, at 248. One could describe these habits differently, see G.
BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN
ADVOCACY 32-33 (1978), and Cramton does in his discussion of each. Cramton, supra note
50, at 248-52. 1 am not myopic in my view of the habits and values that make up the legal
intellectual framework. They can produce evil as well as good, and can become
straitjackets as well as heuristics. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 9-10 (1964); See also Elkins,
The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask 64 VA. L. REV. 735, 738-41 (1978).
In their design and potential effect, however, the legal habits of mind are liberating rather
than constraining.
110. By using law school thinking methods in practice contexts clinical teachers also
could demonstrate the ways in which analytical skills are eminently practical, and thus
show the "relevance" of law classroom instruction.
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Why clinical teachers"' would use persuasion mode behavior so
pervasively is difficult to discern but hypotheses are possible. 112
Because the foregoing data were collected before the persuasion mode
111. I continue to limit my conclusion to clinical practice instruction. See note 12
supra. Communications that regularly would be ambiguous in a classroom might be clear
face-to-face, or vice versa; and behaviors consistently perceived as manipulative and
stifling (i.e., persuasion mode) in one setting, might be seen consistently as structuring
and stimulating (i.e., learning mode) in the other. The persuasion/learning mode construct
might be a useful heuristic device for analyzing classroom instruction, but systemic
differences between one-to-one and one-to-many relationships suggest a separation of
classroom and practice instruction for purposes of this analysis.
These reasons notwithstanding, some have suggested that it is disingenous to
pretend that this article is not about law instruction generally. It is obvious from the
analysis, they say, that overuse of the persuasion mode is a problem in traditional law
teaching as much as it is in clinical teaching. I do not intend to be coy on this issue. I
believe that my basic thesis is true of traditional law teaching. However, the explication of
that thesis on the basis of data from traditional settings would be different in important
respects from what I have said here. I want to be careful to avoid the charge that I have
extrapolated too freely from limited data. I am collecting data about traditional law
instruction and I plan to write about that subject in the future.
112. The consequences of this pervasive teaching of the persuasion mode may not be
limited to the learning of law. The clinical students I have observed regularly behaved
toward clients and colleagues in ways that strikingly resemble the persuasion mode. For
example, in interviewing, students often reconstructed past events incompletely by
missing or by filling in ambiguity in factual reports; unnecessarily controlled decisions
about topic choice, emphasis, and the nature of significant evidence; avoided relevant
issues where strong feelings were present; and "protected" others from embarrassing or
threatening topics by not discussing these topics.'
In counseling, students regularly narrowed options selectively and secretly;
argued for preferences subliminally and indirectly; predicted outcome in unconfrontable
and self-reinforcing ways; and manipulated expectations through selective release of
information about procedures, customs, institutions, and personnel. In working with pef.rs
and supervisors, students routinely suppressed relevant ideas and feelings that were
different from those held by persons in authority; uncritically accepted suggestions of
superiors without probing statements such as "my experience is"; filled up days with
technical tasks to the exclusion of reflective analysis; avoided review of their work by
minimizing contact with supervisors; staked out idiosyncratic positions and held
stubbornly to them, even when obstructionist; and "forgot" to consult supervisors before
acting materially to affect their casework.
Often, the students' use of the persuasion mode was quite subtle. For example, in
the following discussion a student wanted to determine whether a legal aid client would
consent to having her interview videotaped.
Student/Attorney: First, thank you for coming . . . first of all, for
cooperating with this. We've done it before and it's
worked out successfully, but if there's anytime you
feel at all uptight about it, or at all nervous, tell
me, and we can just click it off like that. Thank you
for also, umh, for coming in from
umh. We usually, we're very new on this appoint-
ment basis, and we know that makes clients have
to wait a few weeks, but it does help out, and we
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hypothesis was articulated, however, participants were not questioned
for motive, purpose, or justification. Thus a discussion of causes must
necessarily be speculative. 113 Perhaps clinical teachers have not
identified the patterns of persuasion mode behavior in themselves and
in clinical law instruction, reduced these patterns to descriptive
statements, and analyzed them explicitly for usefulness and limits.1
14
Clinical teachers' theories of instruction may be no more than
catalogues of maxims dictating avoidance of those parts of their own
legal education they found most objectionable. Their understanding may
be symptomatic, however, and cause them to believe that changing the
outward tone of teacher-student interaction is the same as changing its
substance.
think we can give better service. So I thank you for
that also. You're in for a divorce case?
Client: Yeah.
Student/Attorney: Why don't you begin to tell me something about
.. . (client interrupts).
Prior to the meeting, the client had been asked by a receptionist if she would
agree to the taping, and she "consented." The student had decided to "test" this. Yet his
method all but guaranteed that the conclusion would be confirmed. He began with a
presumption in favor of taping, thanked the client for agreeing and then said (implicitly)
that those who tape are "cooperative" and "successful," and not "uptight" or "nervous,"
leaving the client to conclude that those who do not tape are ungrateful, obstructionist
failures, constantly on edge. He left little room for the client to react before changing the
topic and thanking her again. The student smiled throughout and used a tone of voice that
was friendly. What the client would have done had she been told that taping was a choice,
that how she chose would not affect her representation, that cooperative, successful, and
relaxed people sometimes chose not to tape, and that her tape would be shown to large
classes of law students in the same city and across the country, is difficult to know. It is
such domination through subliminal signaling, the same process used by the clinical
teachers in the excerpts in the text, that is the most widespread form of client control in
the clinical practice I have observed.
The suggestion that clinical students may transfer persuasion mode habits,
learned from or reinforced by their teachers, to law practice is admittedly speculative.
Longitudinal studies have not been done on the participants in my data, and the
additional variables that influence practice behavior are legion. On the other hand, the
assumptions underlying such a suggestion - that law schooling (including practice
instruction) socializes, see note 41 supra, that socialization develops habits, and that
habits transfer from setting to setting - are not startling. See Stone, supra note 4, at 422.
113. See Bakan, supra note 22, at xiii-xiv.
114. There is a subcategory to this lack of awareness explanation. Each of the teachers
in these excerpts may have had objectives for these meetings that were in conflict with
effective instruction. For example, without knowing it, each may have wanted to avoid
issues that troubled him emotionally or intellectually, to compete successfully with his
students in evaluation of work product, to wield power unilaterally, or to convince the
student of the "correct" interpretation of whatever was being discussed. These objectives
may have been strongly but tacitly felt and the teachers may have pursued them
unselfconsciously but strategically (as one would expect). Compare the behavior of the
student as illustrated in note 112 supra.
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There are factors suggesting that such incomplete understanding
might exist. For example, in the early models of clinical instruction,
maximizing lawyering experiences for students was the most important
priority, and elaborate fieldwork mechanisms were developed to respond
to this felt need. These programs became bureaucratic nightmares,
turning "instructors" into office managers, who had all they could do to
see that deadlines were met. The Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR), despite its many beneficial con-
tributions to clinical instruction, had much to do with this "experienc-
ing" emphasis."
15
One consequence of this emphasis was that clinical instructors
found themselves in worlds where scholarship was impossible because
all of their fingers were in dikes, and where the adoption of a critical
perspective on their teaching was too threatening to contemplate
because there was not time to act on critical insights, even if present.
This noncritical "experiencing" tradition may still be dominant, even
though the scope of most fieldwork programs has begun to be controlled
and, in some places, perhaps cut back." 6 This emphasis may not have
prevented clinical teachers from teaching effectively at first, but in an
insidious way, it may have set them on a course of self destruction.,
1 7
115. See note 2 supra. CLEPR is also a synonym for William Pincus, the only director
the organization has ever had. In the preface to a new edition of his essays, Pincus reports
that "CLEPR has been credited with having had the most significant impact on legal
education since Christopher Columbus Langdell gave the case system of instruction to the
law schools a century ago. We would agree .... " W. PINCUS, supra note 2, at xi. Pincus
does not say who gave CLEPR this credit or why. Moreover, he does not seem to appreciate
that the secret of Langdell's success was a new intellectual paradigm for law study,
capable of justification (albeit, within a "community of interpretation," see Abraham,
supra note 13, at 685-86), at then sophisticated levels of philosophical and scientific
thought, as well as productive of practical results. The power of the so-called Langdellian
innovation was that it was both intellectual and practical; in some ways all things to all
people.
Proponents of clinical education, particularly CLEPR (Pincus) have not yet
provided the intellectual equivalent of Langdell's famous "law study as science" argument.
One feels guilty about criticizing Pincus's writing for the absence of an intellectual
justification for clinical teaching. In some ways, it is like condemning a dinghy for not
being a destroyer. But the fact that Pincus's work is viewed as serious scholarship by
many clinical teachers, and the patent irresponsibility of spending ten million dollars on a
dinghy, make the criticism necessary. I appreciate that the foregoing paragraph may not
be in the learning mode.
116. See Memorandum from the Special Committee on Clinical Education of Universi-
ty of Michigan Law School to Faculty (Mar. 30, 1979), at 17-18. But see Memorandum
from the Committee on Clinical Education of Harvard Law School to Faculty and Students
(Mar. 20, 1979), at 6 (copy on file with R. Condlin).
117. Eventually, students do not enroll in courses in which the idea content does not
evolve. Cf. Pipkin, supra note 41, at 257-65 (discussing the effect on student enrollment of
the failure to develop idea content in the professional responsibility field). This is
particularly threatening to clinical instruction because much of its presence in law school
is attributable to student demand.
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Since the idea content of clinical instruction has not developed in
scholarship, 118 it may be that there are now very few clinical ideas, new
118. Most clinical "scholarship" is found in such journals as the Newsletter of the
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR), The Journal of Legal
Education, Clinical Legal Education Perspective, and bar association journals. In a fashion
that reminds one of grant proposals, these articles usually guide the reader over the
surface of some new (or not so new) course of study offered by the authors at their
respective schools. See, e.g., G. GROSSMAN, supra note 2, at 40-55 (representative
examples). "Reflections on my semester" seems to be the organizing theme, though more
often than not "reflections on" means "mechanical description of." This format may have
been borrowed from an early article that was truly reflective, see Bellow & Johnson, supra
note 5, but in most cases little more than the word reflections has been transferred. For
representative examples of a still separate category of writing that I would term "opinion
evidence" on the value of clinical instruction, see articles written by Pincus and Brickman
cited in G. GROSSMAN, supra note 2, at 18-19, 32. See also W. PINCUS, supra note 2, where
all of the Pincus scholarship is collected in a single volume. The foregoing literature
evidences few, if any, of the characteristics of university scholarship. For example,
discussion of unproductive teaching methodologies or substantive ideas about law practice
is virtually non-existent. One looks in vain, as Herbert Dreyfus did into the early
scholarship about artificial intelligence, "for a few carefully documented failures." H.
DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS CAN'T Do: THE LIMITS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2 (rev. ed.
1979). The most recent addition to the clinical "literature" is the long awaited Report by
the AALS-ABA Clinical Guidelines Committee. It is, unfortunately, the proverbial camel,
that is, a horse built by a committee.
The time for the development of clinical scholarship is early, however, and there
are promising signs. There are three new, excellent clinical coursebooks, see G. BELLOW &
B. MOULTON, supra note 107; L. BROWN & E. DAUER, supra note 10; R. REDMOUNT & T.
SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1980); a number of thoughtful new texts
about lawyering processes, see D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 84; K. HEGLAND, TRIAL
AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL (1978); T. SHAFFER, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1976); A. WATSON, supra note 84; and a flurry of new writing
in the law journals which, although mixed in quality, has begun to address basic
conceptual questions from explicit intellectual frameworks. While little, if any, of this
scholarship is "mature" in a larger sense, see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 10-15 (1962) (describing the characteristics of mature scholarship in
scientific research); Derrida, supra note 13, at 210-12 (illustrating theoretical dispute in
the mature scholarship of the philosophy of language), there is a subtle and promising
evolutionary trend in these articles. Compare J. Barkai, supra note 13; Simon, supra note
3; G. Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and Behavior (1980)
(unpublished paper) (copy on file with R. Condlin); Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 4; and
Lowry & Kennedy, supra note 63, with the articles in COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT (1973) and
CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE (1971). For a more positive
assessment of the foregoing literature, dividing it into schools of thought, see C.
Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about Lawyering (unpub-
lished paper) (copy on file with R. Condlin). If the gauntlet of Simon's attack on the
"psychological vision" is picked up, as it should be, see Simon, supra note 3, the first
disciplinary dispute within clinical scholarship may result. It is ironic, though perhaps not
surprising, that Simon was not a university law teacher at the time that he wrote his
attack. For an example of how such disputes can contribute to the maturation of a subject,
see B. KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 256-337 (1977) (describing the
disputes between William James and Josiah Royce and the effect of those disputes on the
development of their respective philosophies).
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to students, to teach. If so, clinical teachers may be compensating for
this deficiency by becoming increasingly authoritarian.
Clinical teachers also lack certain resources the presence of which
would make understanding their subject easier. For example, they do
not have elaborately developed teaching materials embodying alterna-
tive conceptions of subject matter, nor mentors or colleagues who have
identified and can transfer finely honed subject matter insights and
pedagogical techniques. Clinical teachers must manufacture or discover
these resources (which their non-clinical colleagues take for granted) in
the first instance, while simultaneously meeting instructional commit-
ments. This problem is exacerbated by the idiosyncratic nature of the
clinical subject matter whose time frame, setting, and data base differ
substantially from those of traditional law teaching. 1 9
In addition, clinical teachers may fear that a self-conscious
examination of the (persuasion and learning mode) values underlying
their teaching would result in "indoctrination" of students in teacher
values. 120 These teachers may believe that they should remain neutral
about such issues and that silence equals neutrality. The difficulty with
this understandable wish to remain neutral is that neutral vantage
points do not exist. 12 ' A clinical law teacher cannot avoid taking sides
in the continual conflicts between competitive and collaborative values
in law relationships. He must choose, and his choices will be apparent to
the world around him. A belief in neutral vantage points can hide these
facts from a teacher; and unselfconsciousness about such a belief,
perhaps present in the preceding illustrations of practice supervision,
can prevent a teacher from becoming aware of his "neutral" ideological
constraint.
The irony is that the unavoidable argument for particular value
preferences that the teacher will make (if only in the way he acts) is
more likely to indoctrinate when it successfully anesthetizes the
skeptical faculties of the student, for example, by convincing him that
the teacher is neutral. A clinical teacher can avoid indoctrination only
by identifying and discussing noncoercively 221 the value preferences
implicit in his teaching; this action puts a student on notice that he
must provide the argument and evidence that the teacher will not.
119. See note 2 supra.
120. Indoctrination is an academic bte noir, and a preoccupation with its avoidance
has stunted growth in several fields of instruction in recent years. See Oldenquest, supra
note 42, at 243-46; Bennett & Delattre, Moral Education in the Schools, TIlE PU1It3C
INTEREST 81 (1980).
121. See Bellow, supra note 3, at 376.
122. See note 42 supra (describing noncoercive dialogue).
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Clinical teachers' refusal to consider value perferences explicitly,
perhaps a paternalism based upon a low opinion of their students
abilities to think for themselves, 123 creates a more serious risk of
indoctrination than anything else that clinical teachers could do.
Another possible explanation for clinical teacher persuasion mode
behavior, and this is more difficult to assess, is that many clinical
teachers may not conceive of themselves as teachers, even though they
say that they do. Many have come recently from practice and may not
have adjusted their role conception or values from those of lawyer to
those of teacher.'2 4 They may have one understanding of the technique
of law practice and feel a natural inclination to convince others of that
understanding. Critically examining their own first premises, in public,
against an ideal, for the purpose of understanding may be an unfamiliar
process.
Finally, in using the persuasion mode pervasively, clinical teachers
may be doing no more than carrying out their part of a tacitly shared
institutional and cultural task. Persuasion mode behavior is used
throughout law school dialogue for tacit instruction in "adversarial
skills," and it appears in the culture at large12  perhaps as one
manifestation of the aggressive instinct. As such, the mode is second
nature to teachers and students and a process that they are implicitly
asked to perfect.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would be ironic and sad if, in fact, clinical teachers suggested and
reinforced habits likely to be ineffective in much of law learning and
practice. Ironic because the clinical teachers I have studied did not
intend to teach ineffective habits, and when they discovered this content
123. See, e.g., notes 88 to 97 and accompanying text supra, where this kind of
paternalism seems to be at the basis of the teacher's refusal to raise and discuss his
judgment that the student was arrogant.
124. Cf. W. PINCUS, supra note 2, at 105. The tension between scholarship and practice
interests is a familiar one, about which commentators have written insightfully and
eloquently. See, e.g., Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L.
REV. 637 (1968); Redmount, The Transactional Emphasis in Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 253.
125. See, e.g., D. RIESMAN, INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED (1954); P. SLATER, THE PURSUIT
OF LONELINESS (1970). This raises the question of whether persuasion mode behavior is
unique to legal education or whether it is found in professional education generally.
Considerable recent scholarship suggests that patterns in the socialization of lawyers
parallel similar patterns in the socialization of other professionals. See, e.g., B. BLEDSTEIN,
THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1976); T. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL




in their teaching, they repudiated and began to correct it.126 Moreover,
clinical teachers as a group have been concerned about issues of
teaching and learning out of proportion to their numbers in law school:
They write almost exclusively about methodology, 127 experiment with
new forms and systems of instruction, and, according to their reports,
incorporate the end products of this reformist effort into their teaching.
It would be sad if clinical teachers taught such habits, not only because
one-to-one law school instructional opportunities are a resource too
precious to waste, but also because, in their own way, clinical teachers
would then contribute to the causes of the popular dissatisfaction with
lawyers.' 28 This is the opposite of their objective but may, in fact, be the
126. For these teachers, precise knowledge of their ineffectiveness has produced
learning dilemmas, see note 32 supra, which the teachers felt competent and encouraged
to resolve. See note 87 supra. It has not been necessary for them to investigate clinically
(in the psychological sense) the causes of their behavior before beginning to change it.
(However, some issues may mobilize strong defenses, which will prevent resolution by acts
of intellect and will - a separate issue not addressed here.) Argyris has described the
change process in more detail. See C. ARGYRIS & D. SCd-IN, supra note 22, at 110-36;
ARGYRIS, supra note 22, at 23-26.
127. "Methodology" is not the precise term, see note 3 supra, but it is close enough to
lead clinical teachers to the patterns I have discussed.
128. See note 112 supra. Over the years lawyers and their activities have been
disliked. See, e.g., M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 1776-1876,
32-34, 44, 46, 49-52, 84-85, 136-37 (1976); J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW
250-52, 275, 277, 278 (1950); D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 12 (1973). At
the moment, this dislike appears to be particularly intense. See, e.g., Auerbach, As
Lawyers Multiply, Civilization Decays, LEARNING & L., Summer 1977, at 10; J. LIEBERMAN,
supra note 106; A. STRICK, supra note 106. For a qualified and, to some extent,
contradictory view, see Botein, Professional History Reconsidered, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
60, 70-78 (1977); Botein, Reflections on the New Humanism in Law, 22 WAYNE L. REV.
1295 (1976).
Lawyers are criticized for four generic failings: (1) unsociability - that they
manipulate and control people, are insensitive to the nontechnical and personal
dimensions of relationships, and (even when on the same side) are unpleasant to deal
with, see, e.g., T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 107-35,
231-52 (1977) (and bibliography contained therein); Redmount, Attorney Personalities and
Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 972 (1961); Watson,
supra note 4; (2) superficiality - that they are unimaginative and shallow technicians
who routinely simplify and process cases so that client interests go underdeveloped and
inadequate outcomes are produced, see, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? 29-61 (1974); Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid
Experience, NLADA BRIEFCASE, Aug. 1977, at 106; Hosticka, We Don't Care About What
Happened, We Only Care About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of
Reality, 26 Soc. PROB. 599, 607-609 (1979); Spiegel, supra note 10, at 97-98 (and sources
cited therein); (3) obsolescence - that they are trained in outmoded competencies, are bad
innovators and planners, and have little ability to learn cumulatively from experience or
to work with other professionals in solving problems or developing new systems and
institutions, see, e.g., C. ARGYRIS & D. SCH6N, supra note 22, at 143-44; E. SCHEIN,
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 34-36, 47-50 (1972); Ehrlich, Future Roles for Lawyers:
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effect. For these reasons, the hypothesis that clinical practice instruc-
tion is persuasion mode in nature bears careful and scrupulous analysis.
There is no reason to presume that clinical teachers will use learning
mode behaviors, 129 and the behaviors which they do use must be
determined empirically, not impressionistically.
Reflections on Crossing the Bar, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 325, 326-28 (1977); Lasswell &
McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest,
52 YALE L.J. 203, 205, 212 (1943); Miller, Public Law and the Obsolescence of the Lawyer,
19 U. FLA. L. REV. 514, 521 (1966-67); Palmieri, The Lawyer's Role: An Argument for
Change, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 30, 38; Wasserstrom, Postscript: Lawyers and
Revolution, 30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 125, 129 (1968); Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79
YALE L.J. 1049, 1053, 1056-57, 1060-61, 1065-66 (1970); and (4) amorality (or
apoliticality) - that they systematically make all their skills and knowledge available
without regard to objectively defined and idealistic standards of right and wrong, fair and
just, see, e.g., Frankel, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Good Person, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 27, 1978, at
19; Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 191,
193-96 (1978); Jones, supra note 61; Lehman, supra note 10, at 1084-96; Richards, Moral
Theory, The Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy, and Professionalism 1-5
(Jan. 20, 1979) (unpublished paper, delivered to N.Y.U. Colloquium on the Teaching of
Ethics and Moral Values) (copy on file with R. Condlin) (and sources cited therein); Simon,
supra note 3; Simon, supra note 22; Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 5-6 (1975).
129. It may be difficult for clinical teachers to believe that they are reinforcing
ineffective habits because the opposite is their conscious objective. If so, their mistake is to
assume that their thoughts must be as fathers to their deeds. Persons, even clinical law
teachers, often act inconsistently with their espoused views, sometimes on a massive scale.
See C. ARGYRIS & D. SCH6N, supra note 22, at 37-62; Bolman, supra note 22, at 111, 116.
Good intentions are important (without them ineffective behavior would not create
dilemmas, see note 32 supra) but they are far from enough. ARGYRIS, supra note 22, at x.
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